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Through the maturation of the national network of fusion centers, processes and 
capabilities originally designed to detect and thwart terrorist attacks are now applied to 
disaster responses. The fusion process, which involves the synthesis and analysis of 
streams of data, can create incident specific intelligence. The sharing of this information 
can enhance the operating picture that is critical to key decision makers and the discipline 
of emergency management.  
This thesis examined three case studies of fusion center disaster responses 
through a collaborative-based analytical framework. The resulting analysis of the case 
studies identified the crucial role played by fusion centers in responding to disaster events 
in a collaborative effort with emergency operations centers.  
This thesis concludes that fusion centers offer the greatest impact through 
enabling information sharing throughout the response phase. The specific benefits of the 
sharing of information directly influence executive briefings and the deployment of 
resources. This thesis also modeled a collaborative response. The research determined 
that the depth and breadth of these relationships involving cooperative responses must be 
proportionate to the incident and include a level of redundancy. Through a system design 
model, overconnectivity through efficiency was shown to increase the likelihood of 
fracturing cooperative relationships.   
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The modern concept of fusion centers began as a consequence of the examination of the 
circumstances that led up to the coordinated attack on the U.S. on September 11, 2001. In 
The 9/11 Commission Report, the lack of sharing critical intelligence was identified as 
one of the main inhibitors in preventing the attack.1 The idea of “fusion centers” was 
proposed to assist in pooling information in order to coordinate action.2 The centers were 
later defined as:  
a collaborative effort of 2 or more Federal, State, local, or tribal 
government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or information 
with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, 
investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.3 
This model has grown into a national network consisting of 78 centers. The 
centers are positioned in 49 states, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam.4 The 
maturation of the centers and the network at large is assessed through established critical 
operational capabilities, which are associated to a center’s ability to receive, analyze, 
disseminate, and gather intelligence. These capabilities have afforded fusion centers the 
ability to widen their collection and analysis aperture beyond terrorism and move toward 
crime suppression and an “all hazard approach.” This movement is captured in the 2012 
National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report. The report indicates that 96.1 percent 
of centers have embraced the “all crimes” and 70 percent have incorporated an “all 
hazards” paradigm.5 The 2013, final report reflected similar percentages; additionally, the 
                                                 
1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Final Report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: Norton & Company Inc., 
2004). 
2 Ibid., 503. 
3 “Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,” Government Printing 
Office, August 3, 2007, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ53/html/PLAW-110publ53.htm, 
265. 
4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information,” 
January 31, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information 
5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report, 
June 2013, 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2012%20National%20Network%20of%20Fusion%20C
enters%20Final%20Report.pdf, 3.  
 xiv
embracing of an “all hazards” approach remained consistent.6 This progression toward an 
all hazards approach has created an opportunity for the centers to begin to interact with 
emergency managers and, more specifically, emergency operation centers (EOC). 
Through a collaborative relationship these two distinct entities can assist in enabling an 
optimal response to disasters.  
This thesis examines the role a fusion center can play in the response to natural 
disasters. Through the course of researching this question, a natural corollary became 
evident. If collaborative relationships enabled the overall response, should those 
coordinated efforts be permanent or ad hoc? This study overlaid three case studies onto 
an analytical framework designed to braid the capabilities of the centers through a four-
step process. Once through the framework, the results were analyzed using a system 
design model in order to determine the essential elements of fusion center responses.   
This thesis contends that fusion centers provide the greatest impact by 
empowering EOCs through information sharing during the response phase to an incident. 
This information sharing manifested itself through the application of the fusion process to 
data, making event-based analysis available for executive briefings, and affording 
decision makers a complete operating picture in order to effectively deploy resources. 
This outcome was visualized in a system design model. Figure 1 is a visual representation 
of a collaborative response by fusion centers and EOCs. The figure goes beyond 
representing the original research question by demonstrating how the incident will 
ultimately dictate the required connectivity in the cooperative response.  
                                                 






Figure 1. System Design Model of a Fusion Center and EOC Response  
The system design process revealed that a policy-based collaborative relationship 
between the fusion center and EOC should be relative and proportionate. Figure 1 clearly 
illustrates that the scale of the incident drives the response. This creates a need for the 
centers to have a flexible relationship that can expand or contract so the partnership does 
not become fragile through “over efficiency.” The goal should be to design a level of 
connection relevant to the scale of the incident. Through mutual exercises, center specific 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The coordinated attacks on our homeland that took the lives of over 3,000 U.S. 
citizens on September 11, 2001, revealed a critical need for the creation and sharing of 
intelligence between law enforcement on all levels. The National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States., commonly referred to as the 9/11 Commission, 
recognized the absence of intelligence sharing as a key factor in the failure to prevent 
attacks.1 The report identified a number of inconvenient truths. One of the key elements 
was that relevant data was trapped in organizational silos. This practice was the norm due 
to internal policies and a history of fractured or non-existent interagency relationships. In 
2002, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld testified before the House and Senate 
Armed Services Committee. Secretary Rumsfeld stated: 
The dots are there for all to see. The dots are there for all to connect. If 
they aren’t good enough, rest assured they will only be good enough after 
another disaster—a disaster of still greater proportions and by then it will 
be too late.2  
The report highlighted a number of critical opportunities for the exploitation of 
available data, which may have provided opportunities to deter the terrorist plot.3 The 
report contends that a shared analysis of known information collected may have averted 
one of the greatest tragedies in this nation’s history. In the afterword of the report, 
Executive Director, Phillip Zelikow wrote, “Working with the FBI, [sic] key innovation 
at the regional or local level is the rise of ‘fusion centers’ pooling information and 
coordination action . . .”4  
                                                 
1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [9/11 Commission], The 9/11 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2004). 
2 Prepared Testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld before the House and Senate 
Armed Services Committees Regarding Iraq, 107th Cong. (2002). (U.S. Department of Defense), 
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=283 
3 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Final Report. 
4 Ibid. 
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Fusion centers were more clearly defined by the Implementation 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. The act defined the centers as:  
a collaborative effort of 2 or more Federal, State, local, or tribal 
government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or information 
with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, 
investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.5 
This model has grown into a national network consisting of 78 centers. The 
centers are positioned in 49 states, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam.6 Figure 1 
is a map of all of the fusion centers within the national network. The maturation of the 
centers and the network at large is assessed through established critical operational 
capabilities. These baseline capabilities are associated to a center’s ability to receive, 
analyze, disseminate, and gather intelligence. These capabilities have afforded fusion 
centers the ability to widen their collection and analysis aperture beyond terrorism and 
move toward crime suppression and an “all hazard approach.” This movement is captured 
in the 2012 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report. The report indicates that 
96.1 percent of centers have embraced the “all crimes” and 70.1 percent have 
incorporated an “all hazards” paradigm.7 The 2013, final report reflected similar 
percentages, additionally the embracing of an “all hazards” approach remained 
consistent.8 
                                                 
5 “Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,” Government Printing 
Office, August 3, 2007, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ53/html/PLAW-110publ53.htm, 
265. 
6 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information,” 
January 31, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information 
7 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report, 
June 2013, 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2012%20National%20Network%20of%20Fusion%20C




Figure 1.  National Network of Fusion Centers 
A fusion center’s progression toward an “all hazards” approach signifies a 
philosophical shift to incorporating disasters both natural and manmade into its threat 
assessments. This approach requires a fusion center to be willing to focus its established 
baseline capabilities (gather, receive, analyze, and disseminate) toward emergency 
operation centers during the response phase to natural disasters. For the purpose of this 
study, the response phase is defined as the actions taken in the immediate aftermath of an 
incident to save and sustain lives, meet basic human needs, and reduce the loss of 
property and the effect on critical infrastructure and the environment.9  
                                                 
9 Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], Developing and Maintaining Emergency 
Operations Plans, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, version 2 (Washington, DC: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2010), http://www.fema.gov/media-
library/assets/documents/25975?id=5697, 1–9. 
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An analytical framework developed in a federal preparedness guide, 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502, Considerations for Fusion Center and 
Emergency Operations Center Coordination (CPG 502),10 will be used to analyze fusion 
center responses to natural disasters. The guide’s framework is divided into four steps. 
The steps include: familiarization with capabilities, needs and requirements; establish 
partnerships; determine the process; and training, workshops and exercises. A panel of 
emergency managers, law enforcement, intelligence researchers, and representatives from 
fusion centers designed these steps cooperatively in an attempt to improve disaster 
response through a unity of effort. The steps seek to integrate operations by deepening 
connections between the EOCs and fusion centers. This process requires that all involved 
have a baseline understanding of each other’s capabilities and limitations. The steps are a 
mechanism to foster communication between the two centers. The framework will then 
determine if these baseline capabilities are aligned with the needs of emergency managers 
during an active state situation or natural disaster.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The mission and focus of fusion centers has evolved since their original inception. 
In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the centers were designed to 
promote information and intelligence sharing through the “fusion process.”11 This 
process refers to the overarching management of the flow of information and intelligence 
across all levels and sectors of government and private industry.  
Though fusion centers continue to support the effort of counterterrorism, many 
have expanded their mission focus to include an “all hazard” approach. This approach is 
an acknowledgement that centers can apply their baseline capabilities to active state 
situations beyond terrorism. Ultimately, this thesis seeks to answer the following 
question. Can fusion centers play a crucial role during the response phase of natural 
                                                 
10 Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], CPG 502 Considerations for Fusion Centers 
and EOC Coordination, 2010, http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/25970  
11 U.S. Department of Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines, Developing and Sharing Information and 
Intelligence in a New Era, 2005, 
https://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf 
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disasters through collaborative relationships with emergency operation centers? In 
seeking to answer the primary question, this study will explore a secondary question: 
Should collaborative relationships identified through the case studies endure over a 
protracted period of time or should they be configured on an ad hoc basis?  
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Since 2012, the federal government has declared 217 disasters.12 If fusion centers 
had remained myopically focused on their original mission, which was rooted in 
counterterrorism, they would have only had meaningful participation in one event—the 
Boston Marathon Bombing on April 15, 2013. As the network of centers began to expand 
across the country, they have expanded the “fusion process” to include criminal based 
initiatives and eventually an all hazards approach. Throughout this maturation process, 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken snapshots of the network 
through an assessment process. In a 2012 report,13 77 percent of centers in the national 
network characterized their overall mission as an “all hazard” approach. The network has 
shown a greater embodiment of this concept, 45 percent of centers list emergency 
management (emergency operations) as a mission focus area. In the 2013, final report 
over 55 percent of fusion centers in the network list emergency management as a mission 
area.14 In addition to this broadened approach, 20 fusion centers within the network are 
collocated with an emergency operations center (EOC). 
This shift would imply that collaborative relationships between emergency 
managers and fusion center personnel are driven by common sense. The Department of 
Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General conducted a study of EOCs and fusion 
                                                 
12 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Disaster Declarations by Year,” accessed March 9, 
2014, http://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/year 
13 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report. 





centers in an attempt to gage the level of collaboration between those entities.15 The 
study consisted of visitations to 17 fusion centers and 31 EOCs. The study revealed the 
following: 
 83 percent of the locations visited were either unaware of or did not utilize 
the guidance in CPG 502.  
 12 EOC directors were unaware of CPG 502 
 16 EOC directors were aware of CPG 502, but were not applying the 
framework to improve collaborative relationships. 
 11 fusion center directors claimed that they were aware of CPG 502, but 
were not utilizing it.16 
The report included a statement by a fusion center director who claimed he did 
not have a plan to coordinate with emergency managers. When asked about how 
collaboration is managed, the director was quoted as stating, “They just do it.”17 This 
report illuminates the need to identify the roles of fusion centers with regard to responses 
to natural disasters. While collecting data for this study, this researcher engaged in a 
conversation with a colleague in emergency management. Through an informal 
conversation, it became apparent that emergency managers and fusion center personnel 
are disconnected.18 This study may assist in identifying a common lexicon of terms and 
definitions of requirements, which will enhance the overall coordination of the centers. 
This study will examine the collaborative responses between fusion centers and 
EOCs centers through the lens of an analytical framework based on CPG 502, which is a 
DHS document focused on the coordination of the two centers. This resulting analysis 
will serve as a primer for fusion centers to begin to structure collaborative relationships 
with their emergency management counterparts.  
As a result of collaborative relationships, practitioners in the enterprise may be 
able to buy down some risk through shortening the decision cycle. To accomplish this, 
                                                 
15 U.S. Department of Homeland Security [DHS], Office of Inspector General, Relationships between 
Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers (OIG-12-15), 2011, 
http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_12-15_Dec11.pdf 
16 Ibid., 21. 
17 Ibid., 13. 
18 Anonomous emergency manager, personal communication, March 2014. 
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center personnel must learn from the successes and failures experienced in the field. This 
process should assist in aligning with the sentiment of President Barack Obama when he 
called for federal agencies to “lean forward” and facilitate the mobilization of resources 
to victims of Hurricane Sandy through the elimination of “red tape.”19 The analysis 
herein will seek to solidify a guidance document by testing it through real-world 
scenarios. Although every disaster will provide separate and distinct challenges, the 
overall goal will remain the same to improve service to our citizens through the 
streamlining of response polices and processes.  
Recently, responses to some large-scale disasters have been hampered by the 
failure to distinguish information from intelligence and the systemic undervaluation of 
analysis. This exact scenario was presented in the Review of the Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake.20 On February 22, 
2011, a 6.3 magnitude earthquake rocked New Zealand and killed 185 persons and 
injured thousands more.21 This event resulted in over 40 billion New Zealand dollars in 
damages.22 The New Zealand Director of Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
later reviewed this disaster. In a commissioned report, the lack of intelligence greatly 
minimized any situational awareness about the incident.23 This lack of shared 
understanding hampered executive decision-making and contributed to a lag in response 
by emergency managers. Additionally, the ability to analyze information was specifically 
cited as a factor that may have assisted their EOC in responding to crisis. 
It is important to note that this thesis is not intended to evaluate the roles and 
responsibilities of emergency managers; however, background chapter on emergency 
                                                 
19 Joe Davidson, “As Federal Workers Provide Sandy Relief, Obama Says ‘No Red Tape,’” The 
Washington Post, October 31, 2012, sec. Local, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/as-federal-workers-
provide-sandy-relief-obama-says-no-red-tape/2012/10/30/3823ecc6-22c7-11e2-8448-
81b1ce7d6978_story.html 
20 Ian McLean et al., “Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 







management will describe the overall structure of its response for context. This 
description is solely to illustrate points of intersection where the fusion process can be 
applied.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter was designed to provide context regarding the origins and 
subsequent maturation of the fusion center concept. Also included were the central 
questions formulated to drive the study and underscore the significance of the research 
and resulting analysis. The next chapter will describe the methodological process and 
analytical framework used to interpret the data collected.  
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II. METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW 
A. METHODOLOGY 
This study will use a qualitative case study approach to identify the role of the 
fusion center response to natural disasters. The case study method will afford design 
flexibility to generate findings of relevance through the analysis of multiple scenarios.24 
According to Raya Fidel, in The Case Study Method: A Case Study, this method is 
applicable due to the presence of the following three factors: 
 Large variety of factors and relationships 
 No basic laws exist to determine which factors and relationships are 
important 
 The factors and relationships can be directly observed. 
1. Large Variety of Factors and Relationships 
This study will examine the responses to recent natural disasters by the Colorado 
Information Analysis Center (CAIC), the Virginia Fusion Center (VFC), and the New 
Jersey (NJ) Regional Operations and Intelligence Center (ROIC). These centers are 
located in different regions of the country and are of varying sizes. The disasters 
examined will be the recent wildfires in Colorado (2012), extreme winter weather in 
Virginia (2013/2014), and Hurricane Sandy’s impact on NJ (2012). During the response 
phase of these disasters, the fusion centers and EOCs entered into ad hoc collaborations. 
These incidents will serve as “crucial cases” in order to study the level of partnership 
between the two entities. Theses natural disasters are “most likely cases” for the affected 
regions. Each event is a large part of the natural threat profile in the area where they 
occurred.25  
                                                 
24 Raya Fidel, “The Case Study Method: A Case Study,” University of Washington, 1984, 
http://faculty.washington.edu/fidelr/RayaPubs/TheCaseStudyMethod.pdf, 273  
25 “Where to Live to Avoid a Natural Disaster,” New York Times, April 30, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/01/weekinreview/01safe.html?_r=0; Division of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management Colorado Department of Public Safety, Colorado Natural Hazards 
Mitigation Plan (Denver, CO: State of Colorado, 2013).  
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2. No Basic Laws Exist to Determine Which Factors and Relationships 
Are Important 
This study will break the cases into separate elements and overlay the centers’ 
actions onto a preparedness guide created by the U.S. DHS. The guide serves as an 
analytical framework due to its focus on the coordination of fusion centers with 
emergency management centers. Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 (CPG 502) 
provides four steps for the coordination process. These steps include: familiarization with 
capabilities, needs and requirements; establishment of partnerships; determination of 
processes; and training, workshops and exercises. These steps will be applied to the three 
case studies to examine the responses of the fusion centers through their collaborative 
approach to the disasters. The study will be conducted through two main components. 
The actions of the centers will be described in detail, and the subsequent responses will 
be divided into components and inserted into an analytical framework. This framework 
was created to foster collaboration between fusion centers and emergency management.  
3. The Factors and Relationships Can be Directly Observed 
The fusion center role and subsequent collaborative process will be examined 
through available data regarding the events. The data collected will be in the form of after 
action reports, storm related surveys, news articles, and scholarly articles related to 
natural disasters or other applicable weather related events. The case studies will 
incorporate these data sources in order to properly depict the dynamic nature of the event.  
Once compiled, the case studies will be analyzed through a two-step process. The 
data will be inserted into an analytical framework, which is specifically designed to 
enhance collaboration between EOCs and fusion centers. Once through the framework, 
the result will be visualized through a goal oriented, balancing feedback loop system 
design model. This model will demonstrate the collaborative process in order to examine 
all of the “moving parts” in cooperative relationships.  
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B. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The purpose of this analytical framework is to supply a disciplined methodology 
that affords the evaluation of an abstract concept. This may foster the recognition of 
analytical patterns and identify the main data needed to come to a conclusion. The 
included analytical framework was designed to overlay onto the relationships between 
fusion centers and EOCs through the response phase to natural disasters. Case studies of 
three events provided the backdrop for the examination. The resulting analysis seeks to 
incorporate the conceptual system, purpose, and classifications of the related data 
regarding the capabilities of fusion centers, and their ability to influence responses to 
natural disasters.  
Due to the decentralized nature of the national fusion center network, it is difficult 
to prescribe a “one size fits all” schema. Included in the descriptions of the model steps 
are the associated fusion center capability areas.26 The inclusion of these capabilities is 
intended to illustrate the alignment of the proposed coordination processes to all fusion 
centers, regardless of their primary mission.27 
                                                 
26 Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area 
Fusion Centers, A Supplement to the Fusion Center Guidelines (Washington, DC: Global Justice 





Figure 2.  Four Step EOC and Fusion Center Coordination Process28 
Figure 2 is an illustration of the four-step process contained within CPG 502.29 
Each step is fully described below so as to define how the fusion centers in the case 
studies will be analyzed. The description of each step is a summarized from CPG 502. In 
addition to each step, the specific fusion center ability area is included in order to 
demonstrate the alignment form what is proposed to current capabilities.  
a. Step One: Familiarization with Capabilities, Needs and Requirements 
The first step is focused on a basic understanding of each center’s respective 
capabilities and “standing information needs” in an active state environment. 
Requirements such as timelines for analytical products, situation reports, and command 
briefing schedules should be shared. This would require both fusion center and EOC 
personnel to familiarize themselves with each other’s policy and guidance documents. 
Contained within this step is a set of corollary functions, which include: 
 Ability to collect, disseminate, and analyze information 
 Leveraging of interoperable systems between the two disciplines 
 Maintaining virtual watch/warning systems that are linked to electronic 
distribution lists 
 Production of analytical products that are synthesized with multiple data 
streams including queries of relevant databases 
                                                 
28 DHS Office of Inspector General, Relationships between Fusion Centers. 
29 FEMA, CPG 502 Considerations for Fusion Centers; FEMA, Developing and Maintaining 
Emergency Operations Plans. 
 13
 Observing proper protocols in the handling and sharing of classified/
unclassified information 
 Ensuring staff and subsequent analytical products conform to security and 
privacy policies 
 Harness personnel that are cross trained or possess specialized skill sets 
related to the event 
 Ensure continuity of operations throughout the crisis 
b. Step One: Aligned Fusion Center Capability Areas 
Section I Fusion Process Capabilities 
 D. Intelligence Analysis and Production 
  1. Analytical Products  
  c. Identify stakeholders and customer base for specific   
  product lines and request feedback from customers to guide   
 future products.  
  d. Ensure the production of value-added intelligence products   
  that support the development of performance-driven, risk-   
 based prevention, protection, response, and consequence    
 management programs.  
Section II Management and Administrative Capabilities 
 E.  Information Technology/Communications Infrastructure, Systems,  
  Equipment, Facility, and Physical Infrastructure 
  3. Communications Plan  
  a.  Identify how fusion center partners will communicate   
  during  an incident or emergency. Ensure that existing    
 communications capabilities are interoperable.  
   b. Incorporate current communications plans utilized by  
    law enforcement and emergency services. 
  4. Contingency and Continuity of Operations Plans 
   b. Develop the plans in coordination with emergency   
   managers and other appropriate response and recovery   
  officials.  
   c. Clearly define personnel roles and responsibilities during  
    emergency situations.30 
c. Step Two: Establish Partnerships 
The second step was designed to create agency-to-agency partnerships that focus 
on coordination and integration. These agreements should attempt to document roles and 
responsibilities for each respective center during the response to an event. These 
                                                 
30 FEMA, CPG 502 Considerations for Fusion Centers. 
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partnerships can be formalized through MOU(s), standard operating procedures, or 
concept of operation documents.  
d. Step Two: Aligned Fusion Center Capability Areas 
Section II Management and Administrative Capabilities 
 A.  Management/Governance 
  1. Analytical Products  
   1.b. The center’s governance body should include   
    representatives from the state and local law enforcement  
    and public safety disciplines. 
   i.c. Supporting emergency management, response, and   
    recovery planning activities based on likely threat scenarios 
    and at-risk targets.31 
e. Step Three: Determine the Process 
The third step focuses on the exchange of information. This involves the type of 
intelligence/information shared and the method in which it is disseminated. This step 
requires a complete understanding of existing relationships and methods of 
communication each center maintains with the law and public safety enterprise. Through 
this exchange, fusion center personnel should become familiar with the information 
requirements of emergency managers. Once familiar, fusion centers can begin to leverage 
information streams to meet those identified needs. 
Contained within this step is the requirement to coordinate with fusion center 
liaison officers. These liaison officers can be a blend of both the public and private 
sector. This initiative was designed to foster communication with areas that may be 
foreign to emergency managers. The liaison program was constructed to connect with all 
critical elements of both the public and private sector. These sectors include critical 
infrastructure and key resources such as: electric companies, oil refineries, banks, and 
entertainment facilities. These liaison officers could also be utilized to supplement 
assessments through defining the criminal environment associated to a specific event.  
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
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f. Step Three: Aligned Fusion Center Capability Areas 
Section I Fusion Process Capabilities 
 A.  Planning and Requirements Development  
  8. Analytical Products       
   a. Ensure that the center has identified its intelligence and  
    analytical roles and responsibilities in accordance with the  
    National Incident Management System (NIMS) and  
    Incident Command System (ICS). 
Section II Management and Administrative Capabilities 
 A.  Management/Governance 
  3. Collaborative Environment 
   b. Include the identification of entities and individuals   
    responsible for planning, developing, and implementing  
    prevention, protection, response, and consequence-  
    management efforts at the state, local, and tribal levels.  
   f. Develop and implement a Memorandum of Understanding  
    (MOU) or Agreement and, if needed, nondisclosure  
    agreements between the center and each stakeholder who  
    intends to participate in or partner with the fusion center.32 
g. Step Four: Training, Workshops and Exercises 
The fourth step is centered upon joint training opportunities. These opportunities 
include formal training classes designed to cross train fusion center and EOC personnel, 
workshops, and scenario based group exercises. 
h. Step Four: Aligned Fusion Center Capability Areas 
Section I Fusion Process Capabilities 
 A.  Planning and Requirements Development  
  10. Exercises 
   b. Exercises should involve all relevant center personnel  
    and constituents and should contribute to understanding the 
    value of the statewide Fusion Process, the center’s   
    collection plan, the SAR process, analytical products, the  
    center’s role in the Information Sharing Environment, and  
    the center’s role in response and recovery activities in  
    accordance with NIMS and ICS.   
Section II Management and Administrative Capabilities 
 D.  Personnel and Training 
  3. Training Plan 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
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   b. At a minimum, all center personnel should be b. trained on: 
    ii The center’s privacy and security policies and  
     protocols.33 
C. SYSTEM DESIGN MODEL 
The model will be based on a study of Donella Meadows’ work in Thinking in 
Systems: A Primer.34 The system design model will afford the reader the ability to 
visualize the elements and behaviors of an abstract concept such as a collaborative 
relationship between EOCs and fusion centers. Meadows addresses the central insight of 
the systems theory by observing the relationship between structure and behavior. 
Meadows believes that through observation, we can begin to understand how systems 
work, for the mere understanding of the elements of a system does not address how it 
performs.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The methodological overview provides an insight to the approach used to 
determine the criticality of fusion centers during the response phase to natural disasters. 
The approach is specifically codified due to the boundless nature of studies in the social 
sciences. Within this chapter, an analytical framework, CPG 502, is dissected to 
demonstrate how the data will be interpreted and ultimately applied by overall study. 
The following chapter will serve as a literature review for relevant works on 
fusion centers and EOCs. The chapter will continue to expand and view collaboration 
through several lenses, including the homeland security enterprise, natural environments, 
and societal contexts. This will offer a global view of the topic prior to exploring the 
practical applications of the study.  
 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Donella Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer (White River Jct., VT: Chelsea Green Publishing, 
2008). 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This review is divided into several categories in order to provide a baseline 
understanding of all of the issues influencing this topic. The research involved in 
examining the collaborative relationship between fusion centers and EOCs spans across 
several sub categories. The review will begin by using lens of the pertinent literature to 
provide a brief background of the EOC and fusion center the. Then, the concepts of 
complexity, systems design, and collaboration will be reviewed. It is important to 
establish a shared context of the scale of the disasters addressed in this study. Since 
disasters can be considered relative, this this thesis will use Naim Kapucu’s definition of 
disasters. He defined major disasters as occurrences that are notable, rare, unique, severe, 
and profound in terms of their impact, effects, or outcomes.35 This definition creates an 
understanding the post incident environment, which requires an enterprise wide response. 
B. FUSION CENTERS 
The modern concept of fusion centers began as a consequence of the examination 
of the circumstances that led up to the coordinated attack on the U.S. on September 11, 
2001. The 9/11 Commission Report identified the lack of sharing critical intelligence as 
one of the main inhibitors to preventing the attack.36 The idea of “fusion centers” was 
proposed to assist in pooling information to coordinate action.37 This fusion concept 
continued to mature and was ultimately defined by a U.S. statute, the Implementation 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Public Law 10–53 August 3, 
2007. The law defined the centers as:  
                                                 
35Niam Kaucu, “The Role of the Public Sector in Managing Catastrophic Disasters: Lessons Learned,” 
Administration & Society (2006): 38, no. 3, 
http://62.219.84.197/data/uploads/Articles%20and%20Reports%20from%20other%20organizations/20080
518%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20the%20Public%20Sector.pdf, 290. 
36 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Final Report, 543. 
37 Ibid., 503. 
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a collaborative effort of 2 or more Federal, State, local, or tribal 
government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or information 
with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, 
investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.38  
Between 2003 and 2005, the first iteration of centers were formed and organized 
into a decentralized national network. According to John Rollins, in a report prepared for 
the Congressional Research Service, “the fusion center movement can best be understood 
as a mounting tide.”39 As the centers began to come on line, they were designed to 
“exchange information and intelligence, maximize resources, streamline operations, and 
improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism by analyzing data from a variety of 
sources.”40 The centers became guided by a “fusion process,”41 which was defined in a 
2005 Fusion Center Guidelines report as the ability of turning information and 
intelligence into actionable knowledge. Once created, this knowledge would be shared 
across all levels and sectors of government and private industry.42 Ultimately, the centers 
would be evaluated through assessments relative to four baseline capabilities: receive, 
analyze, disseminate, and gather. Although the centers are measured individually, the 
ultimate evaluation of the centers would be based on the collective capabilities of the 
national network as a whole.   
Though linked through the national network, each center is independently 
governed by state or local entities, and each is measured by the ability to receive, analyze, 
disseminate, and gather information and intelligence.43 This decentralized distributed 
network spawned the expression “If you have seen one fusion center you have seen one 
                                                 
38 “Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,” Government Printing 
Office, August 3, 2007, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ53/html/PLAW-110publ53.htm, 
265. 
39 John Rollins, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress (RL34070) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2008), ahttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34070.pdf, 15. 
40 U.S. Department of Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 2. 
43 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, “2011 Fusion Center Assessment,” 2011, 
http://www.dhs.gov/2011-fusion-center-assessment  
 19
fusion center.”44 This decentralized model has also led to an uneven maturation of 
individual centers. Despite being conceived as a terrorism tripwire, most centers have 
transitioned into other areas. A 2012 assessment of 77 centers revealed that 96.1 percent 
of centers have ventured into crime suppression initiatives while 70.1 percent have 
incorporated an “all hazards” posture.45 
Despite the short history of fusion centers, there is a considerable amount of 
literature dedicated to negative aspects of their operation. Specific areas such as: 
perceived violations of privacy, lack of a comprehensive strategy, sustainable funding, 
and ambiguous authority have become focal points of consternation. In 2007, DHS 
Secretary Michael Chertoff addressed the first annual national conference on fusion 
centers. Secretary Chertoff stated that despite initial grant funding, DHS would not be 
involved in long-term sustainment funding.46 Secretary Chertoff’s statement was 
corroborated by the 2012 assessment of fusion centers.47 The report indicated that 76 
percent of the funding for the national network is provided by state and local 
governments. This fiscal reality mitigates the federal government’s position to mandate 
the practices and policies of the centers. Despite this fact, the report’s findings include 
federal support through grant funding, training, technical assistance, federal personnel 
and access to information and networks.  
A report from the American Civil Liberties Union warned,  
The participation of agencies from multiple jurisdictions in fusion centers 
allows the authorities to manipulate differences in federal, state and local 
laws to maximize information collection while evading accountability and 
oversight through the practice of ‘policy shopping.’48  
                                                 
44 Abold, Guidetti, and Keyer, “Strengthening the Value of The National Network of Fusion Centers 
by Leveraging Specialization: Defining ‘Centers of Analytical Excellence,’” Homeland Security Affair 8, 
no. 7 (2012). 1–29.  
45 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Final Report. 
46 Rollins, Fusion Centers, 44. 
47 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report, 9. 
48 Michael German and Jay Stanley, “What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers?” American Civil Liberties 
Union, 2007, https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf, 10. 
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This ambiguous authority has reportedly led to violations of privacy protections 
that are deeply engrained in the centers. A 2012, report prepared by the U.S. Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations found evidence of the collection and 
reporting of activities of U.S. citizens, who are protected by the First Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution.49  
The literature highlights that the growth and progression of fusion centers has not 
been linear. Their mission sprawl has entered into areas already covered by other 
disciplines. The fusion center is more than a physical location; it embodies a 
methodology of synthesizing data, resources, and personnel in order to provide 
comprehensive analysis of a given topic or incident. In defining the fusion center’s future 
role, it is important to understand the philosophy underpinning its inception. 
C. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS 
The 2010 national preparedness guide, Developing and Maintaining Emergency 
Operations Plans,50 defines EOCs as the physical location at where the coordination of 
information and resources to support management activities normally take place. These 
facilities may be temporary or permanently established and organized or owned by any 
level of government. The literature involving EOCs is limited. A common theme in the 
literature on EOCs is that there is limited study on the centers. For example, Joseph 
Scanlon of the Emergency Communications Research Unit found that available EOC 
literature is generally self-congratulatory in nature yet it contains little empirical evidence 
of utility and best practices.51 Scanlon further stated that the literature lacked detail and 
valid sources.52 Much of EOC literature reviewed for this study involved federal 
guidance documents designed to familiarize practitioners with generalized EOC concepts. 
                                                 
49 Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers, United States Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, 
112th Cong., 35 (2012), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report_federal-support-for-and-
involvement-in-state-and-local-fusions-centers 
50 FEMA, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans. 
51 Joseph Scanlon, “The Role of EOCs in Emergency Management: A Comparison of American and 
Canadian Experience,” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 12, no. 1 (1994): 51–57. 
52 Ibid.  
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The National Response Framework NRF53 and National Incident Management System 
(NIMS),54 produced by DHS, list the EOCs as critical to creating a common operating 
picture in support of a multiagency coordination group’s management of an incident. 
This picture is generated through the EOCs’ ability to coordinate, communicate, resource 
allocate, track, analyze, and disseminate.  
In an article for Fire Engineering, William Shouldis contended that EOCs could 
be scalable to specific incidents that are low frequency and high risk.55 Shouldis believes 
the management structures of the centers rely on common operating pictures in order to 
allocate necessary resources during the response phase to an incident.  
In 2006, Laura Militello, Emily Patterson, Lynn Bowman, and Robert Wears 
published a study based on the EOC model.56 The study focused on information flow 
during crisis management. Emergency management practitioners were tasked with 
operating an EOC in response to hypothetical incidents. As a result, the researchers found 
three main challenges to EOC coordination: observation data identified issues with 
asymmetric knowledge, barriers to maintaining awareness, and uneven workload 
distribution. The resulting analysis found that the model itself does not guarantee success. 
The researchers recommended frequent exercises to validate the center design and ensure 
EOC personnel are familiar with common job functions and resources.57 
In contrast to fusion centers, the significance of EOCs is rooted in the physical 
location. Through the centers, emergency managers run their command and control in 
active state environments. It is important to note that although some EOCs continuously 
                                                 
53 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008). 
54 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008). 
55 William Shouldis, “The Emergency Operations Center: A Vital Preparedness Tool,” Fire 
Engineering 163, no. 5 (2010), http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/print/volume-163/issue-
5/Features/the-emergency-operations-center-a-vital-preparedness-tool.html 
56 Laura G. Militello et al., “Information Flow during Crisis Management: Challenges to Coordination 




operate, they are reactive in nature whereas fusion centers are continually seeking to 
forecast through analysis. 
D. COMPLEXITY AND SYSTEMS THINKING 
Complexity and systems thinking are pivotal components to this study. Both of 
these forces influence the optics through which the central question is analyzed. A great 
amount of literature has been written on both subjects. These concepts are so malleable 
they can be applied to almost and field of study. Included are examples where these 
approaches are applied to disasters. Although complexity is a broad topic, generally the 
literature is aligned with a definition offered by Yaneer Bar-Yam. In a paper for the New 
England Complex Systems Institute, Bar-Yam opined that complexity is a system of 
interacting components whose collective behavior cannot be easily inferred from the 
behavior of the parts in isolation.58 This definition directly links to systems thinking. 
According to Lukas Schoenberger, Andrea Schenker-Wicki, and Mathias Beck, systems 
thinking is a field of study that examines complexity holistically through dynamic cause 
and effect over time.59 The relation of these two concepts creates a mechanism that can 
address difficult problems. In essence, the system thinking design can visualize 
collaborative relationships that seek to mitigate the complex nature of disasters.  
L. Douglas Kiel addressed the convergence of these two concepts in a paper 
centered on managing periods of extreme instability. According to Kiel, in times of high 
instability, such as disasters, emergency managers must match the incident with unstable 
fluid responses.60 David J. Snowden and Mary Boone furthered the disaster scenario 
described by Kiel. In a Harvard Business Review article, “A Leader’s Framework for 
Decision Making,” the researchers explore frameworks that may assist in shortening the 
                                                 
58 Yaneer Bar-Yam, Multiscale Representation Phase I, New England Complex Systems Institute, 
2001, http://www.necsi.edu/research/multiscale/SSG_NECSI_1_CROP.pdf 
59 Lukas Schoenenberger, Andrea Schenker-Wicki, and Mathias Beck, “Analyzing Terrorism from a 
Systems Thinking Perspective,” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 1 (2014): 16.  
60 L. Douglas Kiel, “Chaos Theory and Disaster Response Management: Lessons for Managing 
Periods of Extreme Instability,” in Proceedings What Disaster Response Management Can Learn From 
Chaos Theory, ed. Gus A. Koehler, May 1995, https://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/96/05/over_12.html 
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decision cycle.61 One of the main challenges faced by emergency responders is choosing 
the proper strategy when faced with several “right answers.” According to Snowden and 
Boone, the possibility for multiple correct answers stems from the fact that the 
relationship between cause and effect can be impossible to determine because of 
continuous shifts that eliminate the ability to detect trends and patterns.62 As a result of 
this dynamic environment, it is difficult to craft a strategy that accounts for all of the 
variables. Snowden and Boone believe these situations create a realm of “known 
unknowns.” Executive leaders who are continuously seeking to stay ahead of the 
changing environment in order to satisfy public expectations compound this reality. 
According to Thad Allen, the “social contract” we have created with our citizens requires 
the emergency management discipline to efficiently respond to disasters and restore 
normalcy.63 In addition to their response duties, emergency managers are charged with 
providing relevant and actionable information for public consumption. This is best 
accomplished through the analysis of multiple data streams in order to detect any existing 
“signals in the noise.”  
E. COLLABORATION 
Susan Page Hocevar, Gail Finn Thomas, and Erik Jansen defined collaboration as 
the ability of organizations to enter into, develop, and sustain interorganizational systems 
in pursuit of collective outcomes.64 Luis Camarinha-Matos furthered this concept. He 
identified the benefits of collaboration as an increase in “survival capability” relative to 
achieving common goals.65 He included sub-components such as the sharing of resources 
                                                 
61 David Snowden and Mary Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard 
Business Review, November 2007.  
62 Ibid. 
63 Thad Allen, “Confronting Complexity and Creating Unity of Effort: The Leadership Challenge for 
Public Administrators,” Public Administration Review 72, no. 3 (2012): 320–21, doi:10.111/j.1540-
6210.2912. 
64 Susan Hocevar, Gail Fann Thomas, and Erik Jansen, “Building Collaborative Capacity: An 
Innovative Strategy for Homeland Security Preparedness,” Advances in Interdisciplinary Studies of Work 
Teams 12 (October 2006): 255–74, doi:10.1016/S1572-0977(06)12010-5. 
65 Luis Camarinha-Matos, “Fair Distribution of Collaborative Benefits,” in Encyclopedia of 
Networked and Virtual Organizations, ed. Maria Manuela Cruz-cunha, 601–607 (Hershey, PA: Information 
Science Reference, 2008).  
 24
and joining of complementary skills. Much of the literature reviewed, lauded 
collaboration and focuses on its benefits. As a concept, collaboration is positively 
associated with increased efficiency, adding durability to collective decisions, and 
serving as a force multiplier. Loan-Clarke and Preston highlighted key results of 
collaborative efforts, such as the transfer of skills, sharing of individual abilities, and the 
enhanced dissemination of network capabilities.66 Dilek Cetindamar, Bulent Catay, and 
O. Serdar Basmaci examined these positive attributes and observed competition through 
collaboration in the Turkish textile industry.67 Their research determined that each 
contributing partner received individual benefits while collaboration can supply 
overarching macro benefits related to increased potential for competitive advantage 
arising from pooled resources and innovative capabilities. 
This sentiment was echoed in a white paper written by Frost and Sullivan on the 
impact of collaboration on business performance.68 Their research studied the impact of 
collaborative efforts on business performance. The study examined the process through 
the use of a collaborative index. The authors created the index to capture a measurement 
of collaboration for varying global industrial enterprises, which included health care, 
manufacturing, government, and financial services. These enterprises spanned both the 
public and private sector. The researchers were able to identify collaboration as a key 
driver of success for business performance, profitability, and sales growth. These benefits 
were directly tied to “high quality collaboration” that can be characterized by a 
significant breadth of applied interaction and sharing with external partners.69 
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This Frost and Sullivan study pinpointed capacities that were essential to create 
the benefits.70 The authors realized that collaborative benefits in global enterprises were 
realized through harnessing a culture of openness (intraorganizational communication) 
and the creation of a decentralized structure. Through this exploration of the concept, the 
researchers determined:  
collaboration quality directly impacts business performance through four 
channels: the productivity of collaborative efforts to achieve a given task, 
the effectiveness of supporting business strategy, the recognition that 
collaboration is a sustainable, competitive advantage, and a coordinated 
team that is committed to driving collaboration as a process in the path to 
success.71 
These private sector examinations of collaborative practices assist in 
demonstrating a positive value in the concept. Unlike government, the private sector has 
an interest in assessing all of its practices relative to the “bottom line.” This requirement 
compels it to measure all of its processes. Although this research does not create an index 
for the relationship between the two centers, the work of Frost and Sullivan is a useful 
tool in viewing how collaboration is valued in the private sector.  
These attributes, related to collaboration in the “real world,” extend into the 
natural world. In nature, most collaborative or symbiotic environments occur organically 
between organisms for survival. The literature in this area portrays natural collaboration 
as utilitarian rather than altruistic. In nature, collaboration is based on reciprocity in 
which the interaction is mutually beneficial for all parties. In the book, Learning from the 
Octopus How Secrets from Nature Can Help Us Fight Terrorist Attacks, Natural 
Disasters, and Disease Rafe Sagarin explores the concept of mutualism where 
collaboration can only be maintained through “natural” coercion between disparate 
species.72 The book highlights a study conducted on rhizobium bacteria that were 
discovered living on legume plants, such as alfalfa or soybeans. The collaboration 
between the species entailed the bacteria receiving oxygen from the plant and in return it 
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converted nitrogen to a form the plant could use nutritionally. Saragrin includes an 
experiment in which, nitrogen was replaced with argon, an inert gas. As a result, the plant 
withheld oxygen from the bacteria due to the inability of the bacteria in fulfilling its 
role.73 
In a natural environment the participants regulate the degree and duration of 
collaboration through force. In our world, a collaborative environment occurs through 
less coercive means. Studies identify trust as becoming axiomatic to the creation and 
sustainment of a collaborative relationship. In order to understand how trust can create 
these cooperative domains the concept must be delineated. Akbar Zaheer, Bill McEvily, 
and Vincenzo Perrone authored a study of trust related to interorganizational and 
interpersonal performance.74 They defined trust in two ways.75 They found trust related 
to interorganizational relationships manifested itself as confidence or predictability in 
one’s expectations about another’s behavior, and confidence in another’s goodwill.76 In 
addition, Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone linked trust related to individuals as focusing on 
fulfilling expectations, behaving in a predictable manner, and negotiating fairly when 
opportunism is present.77 This definition became crucial in understanding how trust can 
bind organizations.78 
This perspective on trust provides a context for the belief that personal 
relationships generate trust and discourage opportunistic behavior between firms.79 
Furthermore, the fostering of trust reduces inclinations to guard against opportunistic 
behavior. Finally, the Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone study concludes that the more trust 
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experienced between individuals of organizations the more likely organizations will be 
trusted. 
Renee Graphia Joyal specifically studied the trust component of collaboration 
relative to the law enforcement community. In her study, “How Far have We Come? 
Information Sharing, Interagency Collaboration, and Trust within the Law Enforcement 
Community,”80 Joyal studied the environment of fusion centers and found trust, 
reciprocity, and genuineness emerged as the most important personality characteristics 
facilitating the missions of the centers. Consequently, the nature of a bureaucratic 
environment was identified as a challenge to foment trusting relationships. These 
environments tend to be political and are characterized by high turnover rates that may 
fuel an adversarial atmosphere between aligned agencies.81 
The discovery of collaborative aspects in the natural world as well as derivative 
subcomponents indicates that cooperation toward a common goal can be organic. In 
leveraging this principle for disaster response it is necessary to isolate the conditions in 
which these relationships thrive and attempt to reconstruct those influences. Despite the 
identified benefits of collaborative initiatives, the concept in and of itself is not a panacea. 
Collaboration inherently involves individuals working together, sometimes in 
circumstances that are new and challenging. A Harvard Business Review article, “Want 
Collaboration?,” authored by Jeff Weiss and Jonathan Hughes, identified conflict 
management as a key to successful coordination.82 Their study dispels the myth that 
simply putting people together for a common purpose will immediately create a utopic 
environment. Weiss and Hughes conclude that collaborative initiatives need to manage 
the eventual conflict through institutional mechanisms. The authors characterize this 
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struggle by opining “clashes between parties are the crucibles in which creative solutions 
are developed and wise trade-offs among competing objectives are made.”83 
In Collaborate or Perish, William Bratton and Zachary Tumin provide a 
utilitarian context to collaborative relationships.84 The authors propose that these 
relationships are more than facilitating a free information flow; they require actions that 
lead to results.85 Additionally, Bratton and Tumin distil the concept further and identify 
that at an elemental level, much like in the natural world, these cooperative relationships 
must be mutually beneficial to the partners. The authors explain that in order to properly 
communicate within these relationships, it is critical to establish common platforms. 
These platforms must provide unfettered communication between the parties in order to 
ensure transparency. Depending on the sophistication of the relationship, the platform can 
be as rudimentary as a “grease board” or as complex as a virtual environment.86  
Throughout the book, Bratton and Tumin cite examples of facilitators and 
inhibitors for collaborative relationships. One of the “Headwinds” the authors explore is 
the “endowment effect.”87 This effect explores the verity of prospective collaborators 
overestimating the value of their participation in the relationship. Bratton and Tumin 
attribute this to “loss aversion” and postulate that emotional attachment to processes can 
contribute to this phenomenon. They suggest that this effect should be confronted early in 
the relationship building and realistic values should be attributed to all aligned parties in 
order to establish a “net gain” for all participants.88  
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Although collaborative connections may occur organically, this does not alleviate 
the responsibility of leaders to ensure that individuals involved are receiving their 
perceived benefits. The need for equity goes beyond humanity and is evidenced in natural 
environments. These universal prerequisites for successful partnerships require attention 
through thoughtful management.    
F. COLLABORATIVE PROCESSES BETWEEN EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT AND FUSION CENTERS  
DHS has published several reports that focus on branding the capabilities of 
fusion centers with emergency operation centers during the response to major disasters. 
This literature is mostly in the form of preparedness and guidance documents. A 2011 
report, Relationships between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers,89 
braids the capabilities of EOCs and fusion centers by in linking state and local 
information with strategies and response of the federal government during disasters. This 
report included an audit of the 2011, fusion center capabilities related to disaster 
response. The results of the study concluded that the majority of centers were unaware of 
their potential roles and responsibilities regarding responses to natural disasters. Evidence 
was presented that personnel in over 80 percent of fusion centers were unaware that these 
criteria were provided in the form of federal guidance documents.90  
The literature focused on a collaborative approach between fusion centers and 
EOCs. This cooperative approach is standardized through frameworks designed to 
facilitate responses to natural disasters. Within these documents, the capabilities of the 
fusion centers and EOCs are codified. On the surface, these capabilities reveal that EOCs 
and fusion centers parallel each other. Both EOCs and fusion centers are tasked with 
collection and dissemination of critical information related to disasters. All of the 
available research provides recommendations to streamline these processes by clearly 
defining roles and responsibilities. The recommendations identify the need for efficient 
collaboration through coordination. Some of the methods suggested include, pre event 
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preparation and planning between fusion centers and EOCs. The desired outcome of 
these guidance documents center upon the fusion center’s ability to contextualize the 
situation through analysis. The denouement of this analytical process provides the EOC 
with the “ground truth” of the areas affected by the incident. This information affords the 
EOC the ability to provide direction to the overall operation. These processes are 
designed to streamline the efforts of the centers and have not been formalized through 
policy due to the multiple layers of governments involved in the response to disasters.  
In a joint guide prepared by DHS and the U.S. Department of Justice, 
Considerations for Fusion Center and Emergency Operations Center Coordination (CPG 
502), two case studies are included to highlight collaboration between EOCs.91 These 
cases focused on two national political conventions in which the roles of EOCs and 
fusion centers are diagramed. This document defines the capabilities of both fusion 
centers and EOCs and provides a four-step framework in which a collaborative 
environment can be achieved. The steps include familiarization with capabilities, 
establish partnerships, determine the process, and training workshops, and exercises. The 
examination of each step affords opportunities to find ways to create efficiencies and 
increase coordination.    
A study into building a collaborative capacity for homeland security preparedness 
listed the development of interagency collaboration as critical for efficiently conducting 
routine tasks and innovative responses to natural disasters or terroristic threats.92 This 
research found that collaboration specifically in the homeland security enterprise must be 
built upon trust flexibility, openness, mutual respect, social capitol and pathways of 
communication. These characteristics were highlighted due to the nature of disasters, 
which are traditionally hostile and complex events. The ability to capitalize on these traits 
will foster intelligent improvisation to a rapidly changing disaster environment. 
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A segment of the literature reviewed was in the form of journal articles pertaining 
to case studies of collaborative initiatives by the centers. An article published in the 
Domestic Preparedness Journal, authored by Christian Schulz and Raymond Guidetti, 
described how the NJ ROIC expanded upon existing collaborative frameworks 
established by DHS in CPG 502.93 The article provided a firsthand account of how a 
fusion center could respond to a natural disaster. The reoccurring theme in the article was 
the center’s ability to collect information and data from multiple sources and provide a 
synthesized analytical product designed by the requirements of the consumer. The article 
provided a snapshot of the collaborative potential for EOCs and fusion centers through 
their mutual response to natural disasters.  
Henry Grabar wrote an article that was posted on the Atlantic Cities website that 
indicated Boston is one of the most prepared U.S. cities regarding disaster response. In 
the article, “Boston Is One of the Best Prepared U.S. Cities to Handle a Crisis,” Graybar 
bases his argument on the collaborative practices of the Boston public sector.94 These 
agencies include emergency management, law enforcement, and fusion centers. Graybar 
highlights the “Urban Shield” initiative as evidence of the cities commitment to the 
practice. The “Urban Shield” is a 24-hour exercise in which first responders must 
cooperatively respond to a simulated emergency. These drills produce a robust 
collaborative ethos that converts the practice into a type of “muscle memory” for the 
responding agencies.  
The literature indicates that the field of emergency management is gradually 
shifting toward collaboration in order to enable response to disasters. This need for 
collaboration is illustrated by the work of William Waugh and Gregory Streib, who 
attempted to answer the paradox faced by modern emergency managers. They theorized 
that proper emergency responses are predicated on solid preparation, yet each incident 
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requires a high level of spontaneity.95 The combination of these realities force emergency 
managers to draw from the array of resources available. This shift can also be observed in 
enterprise specific documents focused on streamlining processes through a unity of effort.  
In an after action report written by Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) for an EOC/fusion center collaboration-based conference, statistical data was 
offered to document the shift of fusion centers.96 The document reported that 58 percent 
of centers assign personnel to the EOC during incidents, over 60 percent of centers 
involve the EOC in their polices, and over 80 percent contribute to mutually constructed 
risk assessments. In 2013, DHS released a guidance document regarding the 
incorporation of intelligence into the NIMS.97 This document was a formal approach to 
establishing the value of intelligence for emergency management. Specifically, this new 
function was written to integrate with the national incident command model. Included 
within the document was a graphic that represents the flow of events during the course of 
an incident. Figure 3 is a visual representation of how the intelligence function can be 
implemented in the aftermath of an incident.  
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Figure 3.  Disaster Event Flow98 
Despite not being specifically named, the fusion center and its purpose could be 
easily included in the chart. This theme in the literature signifies that both fusion centers 
and emergency management are beginning to view the value of their cooperative efforts 
through the development of policies from within their own disciplines.  
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G. GAPS IN LITERATURE 
Literature on EOCs and fusion centers is predominantly focused on federally 
produced guidance documents. The documents are clinical in nature and tightly define 
roles and responsibilities. These documents do not provide practitioners in the field a 
richer understanding of the nature of collaborative responses by EOCs and fusion centers.  
Due to the dynamic nature of natural disasters, no response could ever be 
formulaic. Published case studies regarding disasters related to weather, seismic activity, 
and large scale regional flooding would add to the collective experience of practitioners 
and inspire innovative approaches to future events.  
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The literature review was structured to provide an overview of fusion centers and 
EOCs through scholarly works on the disciplines. The remainder of the chapter was 
sequenced to examine the concept of collaboration beyond its positively connoted 
attributes. The depth of the exploration was necessary due to the fact that the majority of 
the works written on the subject laude collaboration through anecdotal examples. 
Thorough research of the subject unearthed studies that specifically identify the 
individual components of collaboration that make it the cynosure of efficiency based 
trends and programs.  
Although the concept creates the appearance of being a panacea, interagency 
cooperative relationships have an optimal ambit. The following chapter provides an 
overview of the EOC—Emergency Support Function (ESF) method to disaster response. 
This chapter should serve as a scientific control compared to the upcoming variable 
responses in the fusion center case studies. In all of the disasters examined in this study, 
the EOC responses were predicated on the ESF format. Conversely, the fusion centers 
responses were ad hoc and specifically designed to mitigate a hurricane, wildfire season, 




IV. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT RESPONSE 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
To answer the question of how fusion centers can play a critical role in 
responding to natural disasters, one must have an understanding of the mechanics of ESF 
specific emergency management. This understanding should include the structure from 
which it operates. The following is an overview of the ESF Emergency Operations Plan 
format. As previously noted, this researcher will not evaluate the form or function of the 
principles of emergency management. The description of the ESF Emergency Operations 
Plan format was designed to provide context to the reader and highlight where fusion 
centers can impact the overall response to an incident.  
Nationally, the majority of emergency managers organize their disaster responses 
through the ESF Emergency Operations Plan format. This researcher discovered that the 
State of New Jersey, State of Colorado, and Commonwealth of Virginia are not 
exceptions to that trend. For the purpose of this study, this chapter shall serve as a primer 
for the EOC responses in the included case studies. Although the ESF format is not the 
only format available to emergency managers, it is the method employed by the states 
referenced in this study. The natural disasters case studies in the following chapters will 
be mainly focused on the actions taken by the fusion centers due to the similarity in the 
philosophies of emergency managers in the three states. 
On March 30, 2011, President Barack Obama signed a directive, Presidential 
Policy Directive (PPD) 899 that attempted to strengthen the security and resilience of the 
U.S. through systematic preparation. This preparation included the threats that pose the 
greatest risk to the security of the U.S., including acts of terrorism, cyber attacks, 
pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters.100 Embedded within PPD 8 is the creation 
of the National Preparedness System, which calls for the following: 
                                                 




The national preparedness system shall include a series of integrated 
national planning frameworks, covering prevention, protection, mitigation, 
response, and recovery. The frameworks shall be built upon scalable, 
flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles and 
responsibilities to deliver the necessary capabilities. The frameworks shall 
be coordinated under a unified system with a common terminology and 
approach, built around basic plans that support the all-hazards approach to 
preparedness and functional or incident annexes to describe any unique 
requirements for particular threats or scenarios, as needed. Each 
framework shall describe how actions taken in the framework are 
coordinated with relevant actions described in the other frameworks across 
the preparedness spectrum.101  
PPD8 incorporated the National Response Framework (NRF), which was 
previously established.102 The NRF included the innovative concept of integrating all 
levels of government in a common incident management framework. The NRF replaced 
the Federal Response Plan (FRP), which was created in 1992, but it outlived its 
usefulness due to its limited role in codifying federal roles and responsibilities concerning 
natural disasters.103 It is important to note that the FRP was the origin of the ESF 
concept.   
The NRF defines the principles, roles and responsibilities, and coordinating 
structures for enabling core capabilities required to properly respond to an event.104 The 
framework illustrates how response efforts intersect with mission areas across the 
governmental spectrum (federal/state/local). The NRF was structured to be in continuous 
operation, and specific elements of the framework can be implemented at any time. The 
structures, roles, and responsibilities contained in the NRF can be implemented in a 
scalable fashion, depending on the scope of the disaster. The flexibility of the framework 
affords emergency managers the ability to use key components prior to an event. The 
strength of the system rests on the ability to selectively implement NRF structures and 
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procedures through a scaled response, delivery of the specific resources and capabilities, 
and manage coordination.105 
B. ESF FORMAT 
Nested within the NRF is the ESF format. The ESF format requires four 
subcomponents:106 
  
 Basic Plan: This plan provides an overview of the jurisdiction’s emergency  
 management system. It provides a general description of the agencies hazard 
 profile, capabilities, and organization chart. 
   
Emergency Support Functions Annexes: These annexes describe the expected 
roles and responsibilities of the function and list the aligned agencies for mission 
execution. Each function is thoroughly delineated and may include both 
governmental and non-governmental agencies. ESF(s) include the grouping of 
governmental and certain private sector capabilities into an organizational 
structure to provide support, resources, program implementation, and services that 
are most likely needed to save lives, protect property and the environment, restore 
essential services and critical infrastructure.107  
  
 Support Annexes: The support annexes provide a description of the 
 framework through the collaborative process. The annexes  identify the roles of 
 cooperating agencies for incidents that require a coordinated response.  
  
Hazard/Threat/Incident Specific Annexes: These annexes provide a list of 
policies, concepts of  operations, and responsibilities for specific types of 
incidents. These annexes govern the global response of all assets to a particular 
situation.108 
 
Figure 4 is a sample of an ESF format taken from an emergency management 
guidance document.  
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Figure 5 is an illustration of the array of sectors the ESF format continually 
monitors.  
 
Figure 5.  Established FEMA ESF(s)  
Despite following the ESF format, the three identified state offices of emergency 
management vary on their labeling of ESFs.110 For instance, the Commonwealth of 
Virginia utilizes 17 functions while New Jersey and Colorado employ 15 functions. 
Figure 6 (excluding subcategories). 
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Figure 6 is a depiction of the ROIC EOC. It is important to note that the center is 
divided by sector. 
 
Figure 6.  NJ EOC Floor Plan (Organized by ESF) Contained Within the 
ROIC111 
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C. EOC OPERATIONS 
EOCs are typically organized by a combination of ESFs or other coordinating 
structures aligned to disciplines or capabilities. State EOCs are the physical location 
where multiagency coordination occurs through state-level management structures. The 
core functions of an EOC include coordination, communications, resource allocation/
tracking, information collection, and dissemination. Through the harnessing of discipline 
specific expertise, personnel assigned to each function create a network designed to focus 
on consequence management. In addition, EOCs form a common operating picture by 
obtaining and interpreting incident specific data from the field. This occurs through the 
effective coordination and use of ESF(s). In essence, the ESF(s) become the “eyes and 
ears” of the EOC. It properly defines the post-incident environment in order to structure 
an effective response and recovery. Personnel and agencies assigned to specific ESFs 
create opportunities for the EOC to collect information and mitigate function specific 
problems. While, every state maintains an EOC to manage incidents that require 
assistance beyond local levels, some states have additional EOCs for coordinating 
information and resources within a region or area. 
The function and control of the EOC on a state level is only activated after an 
incident has been passed up through the municipal and county levels. The state EOC will 
only assume control once a situation grows beyond parochial boundaries and is requested 
by a local authority. In instances when regional degradation exceeds the capabilities of 
the state, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will provide support.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter was intended to provide the reader a basic understanding of the 
specific emergency management response format utilized by all of the states in the 
upcoming case studies. The array of services and aid provided by emergency managers 
would require a study in and of itself. Incident mitigation begins at the local level prior to 
advancing to the state or federal authorities. This is an important distinction because full 
activations of state EOCs and fusion centers are rare. This creates the need for the centers 
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to communicate in steadily and actively since they have limited opportunities to work 
cooperatively. This overview of the ESF format was designed to avoid redundancy in 
each of the subsequent three chapters. The case studies do not specifically define EOC 
activity due to their common structure; rather, they focus on the fusion center responses 
that were unique in each incident. 
The following three chapters will examine the ROIC, CIAC, and VFC responses 
to natural disasters in their states. Each case study will include background of the 
incident, structure of each center, and mitigation strategy employed. These cases were 
organized to offer the reader the opportunity to observe the strategy overlaid onto each 
center’s structure. In addition to feeding the analysis, these cases may offer some insight 





V. HURRICANE SANDY CASE STUDY 
A. EVENT 
Prior to landfall, Hurricane/Post-tropical Cyclone Sandy exhibited several unique 
features that were different from traditional Atlantic Basin storms. The storm made an 
unprecedented approach from the east and created record storm surges on the East Coast, 
specifically New Jersey. As the storm transitioned to post-tropical, it merged with an 
intense low-pressure system, dramatically increasing its size before landfall.112 Figure 8 
detail the trajectory of the storm as it traveled toward the East Coast of the U.S.  
  
Figure 7.  Hurricane Sandy Trajectory October 22–29, 2012113 
On the evening of October 29, 2012, the storm made landfall on the shores of 
Brigantine, NJ.114 The storm was technically a post-tropical cyclone with hurricane force 
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winds of 80 miles per hour.115 The storm traveled across New Jersey until finally 
diminishing in Pennsylvania on November 1, 2012. This Atlantic storm was the second 
largest on record. At its peak, tropical force winds extended 580 miles from the center.116 
This massive size affected the entire Eastern seaboard and extended inland as far as 
Indiana.  
In summary, 24 states were impacted by the storm, initial damage assessments 
exceeded $50 billion.117 Hurricane Sandy was directly responsible for 147 total deaths, 
twelve of which occurred in New Jersey.118 Hidden within these statistics are countless 
families impacted by the storm. On October 30, 2012, NJ Governor Chris Christie 
appeared on the Fox News Channel (Fox & Friends) and stated that approximately 2.4 
million homes within the state were without power.119  
The majority of power outages were caused by damaged substations and power 
plants as well as downed utility poles. A report prepared by Dr. Stephanie Hoops Halpin 
of the Rutgers School of Public Affairs and Administration found that 68 percent of NJ 
towns reported utility poles down immediately after the storm, with an average of 38 
down per town.120 Included in the study was a NJ municipal survey regarding storm 
damage. The survey indicated that 62 percent of towns reported no power at their police 
station, 65 percent at their fire stations, 76 percent at the municipal buildings, and 52 
percent lost power for their water/sewer facilities.121  
The lack of functioning utilities was soon exacerbated by a statewide gasoline 
shortage. The municipal survey listed, 95 percent of towns had generators to help power 
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their municipal facilities, but fueling them became an issue.122 Also 52 percent reported 
running dangerously low on gasoline that powered their generators while nine percent of 
towns exhausted their entire fuel supply.123  
The crippling of the energy sector became part of a cascading set of failures for 
all of the other critical infrastructure sectors. The storm either severely damaged or 
destroyed schools, hospitals, and roadways. According to FEMA estimates, over 6 
million cubic yards of debris were created as result of the storm.124 That amount of storm 
debris would fill approximately 1,770 Olympic swimming pools.125 This debris did not 
account for the additional 2.5 million cubic yards of sand and silt pushed onto land from 
the surge. 
This event affected all aspects of life within the State of NJ. Although not all 
regions of the state were affected equally, those that took the brunt of the storm would 
soon draw from the collective resources of all levels of government, local, county, state, 
and federal. The magnitude of the subsequent response was paralleled by the magnitude 
of need by the residents of the State.  
B. NJ ROIC RESPONSE TO HURRICANE SANDY 
The NJ ROIC is collocated with the NJ Office of Emergency Management. In the 
days prior to landfall, commanders of the NJ ROIC began to participate in preparations 
for the pending storm. Emergency managers knew that the storm was tracking with a 
northern trajectory along the eastern seaboard. Although the storm’s track had not been 
finalized, NJ authorities began to brace for its probable impact. During this time, the 
ROIC raised its status to level 4 or full activation.126 Upon reaching this level of 
activation, the watch operations element was mandated to assist the EOC with initial 
                                                 
122 Ibid.  
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid., 39. 
125 Ibid.  
126 New Jersey Regional Operations and Intelligence Center [NJ RIOC], New Jersey Regional 
Operations & Intelligence Center Hurricane Sandy after Action Report (internal document, New Jersey 
Regional Operations and Intelligence Center, West Trenton, NJ, 2012). 
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management of the event.127 In this case, the watch operations element monitored the 
situation and assisted in disseminating early notifications from the EOC to specified 
distribution groups.   
The subsequent response of the ROIC was designed to align with the established baseline 
capabilities of the national network. These capabilities were carried out through its unit-
based structure. At the time of the storm, the NJ ROIC was structured as follows (Figure 
8).    
 
Figure 8.  NJ ROIC Element Structure128 
                                                 
127 New Jersey Office of Emergency Management, New Jersey State Hurricane Incident Annex 2013 
(West Trenton, NJ: New Jersey Office of Emergency Management, 2013). 17. 
128 New Jersey State Police, NJ ROIC Taskforce Manual—NJSP Standard Operating Procedure A7 
(internal document, New Jersey State Police, West Trenton, NJ), 5–6. 
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Within these elements, the fusion center further divided into a unit based 
structure. The units within the ROIC during the storm were as follows: 
 Intelligence Watch and Warning Unit (IWW)—The IWW Unit 
operated on a 24-hour basis. The unit assumed building security 
responsibilities and served as the central notification point for all emergent 
operational, intelligence information and asset requests. The unit was 
primarily responsible for providing alerts, warnings, and notifications to 
both public and private sector entities. 
 Intelligence and Analysis Unit (IAU)—The IAU was divided into two 
squads (Threat / Crime). The unit was designed to produce finished 
analytical products to support the needs of the law enforcement 
community. The squads also served as the analytical backbone for several 
statewide information sharing based initiatives. The threat squad was 
designated as a liaison to the federal intelligence community in order to 
coordinate suspicious activity reporting and terrorist screening center 
encounters.  
 Information and Technology Unit (ITU)—ITU was primarily 
responsible for supporting the information and technology (IT) 
infrastructure of the NJ ROIC. ITU was the primary point of contact for 
creating a collaborative IT environment by synergizing systems for 
disparate agencies.  
 Fusion Liaison and Intelligence Training Unit (FLIT)—FLIT was the 
point of contact for both the public and private sector to interface with the 
ROIC. The unit maintained the fusion liaison officer program. This 
program increased information sharing and inter agency connectivity 
throughout the state. The unit was also responsible for expanding the 
knowledge and tradecraft of the ROIC’s analytical processes to all sectors 
working within the state.  
As the storm approached the coast, the ROIC’s original interface with the EOC 
focused on logistical matters.129 Due to the amount of personnel from external agencies 
reporting to the EOC, the IWW unit assumed responsibility for building security. The 
unit was also designated as the center point for dissemination of information related to 
the ensuing event. Additionally, selected IWW unit members were assigned as liaisons to 
the EOC. The assigned liaisons were specifically designated to address the needs and 
requirements of the EOC throughout the event. 
                                                 
129 NJ RIOC, New Jersey Regional Operations & Intelligence Center Hurricane Sandy after Action 
Report, 3–4. 
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During the hours prior to the storm’s landfall, the EOC became populated with 
representatives of the various agencies required to carry out the ESF(s) of the EOC 
response. Members of the ITU were primarily responsible for creating a collaborative 
environment for those involved in the response. This included preparing workstations 
with functioning equipment, facilitating Internet access, and integrating the responders to 
a New Jersey State Police (NJSP) internal virtual platform for reporting and resource 
management. 
Beginning on October 30, 2014, the IAU issued a “Hurricane Sandy” statewide 
criminal activity assessment.130 The assessment included baseline situational awareness 
for the statewide criminal environment and was electronically disseminated through 
IWW. The original assessment compared historic pre-storm crime data to the post-storm 
reality. During the initial response, the assessment morphed into a regional product that 
focused on two counties most severely impacted by the storm.131 The product expanded 
to incorporate thematic maps that overlaid several region specific layers: local criminal 
activity, power outage status, and crime trend/pattern analysis.  
Due to the severity of the storm, IAU members sought to locate gaps in reported 
crime data from police agencies severely impacted. This prompted the unit to deploy 
intelligence collection cells (ICC) in the affected areas.132 The ICCs were established in 
the two counties (Ocean County/Monmouth County), and the eastern portion of the 
counties were divided into areas of responsibilities (AOR). This forward deployment 
provided greater access to information and created a mechanism to further define the 
active state environment.  
                                                 
130 New Jersey State Police, ‘Hurricane Sandy: Statewide Criminal Activity Assessment’ October 30, 
2012 to November 1, 2012” (internal document, New Jersey Regional Operations & Intelligence Center, 
West Trenton, NJ, 2012). 
131 New Jersey State Police, “Monmouth County Bay Shore Ocean County Barrier Islands Criminal 
Activity Related to Hurricane Sandy November 5, 2012 to November 6, 2012” (internal document, New 
Jersey Regional Operations & Intelligence Center, West Trenton, NJ, 2012). 
132 NJ RIOC, New Jersey Regional Operations & Intelligence Center Hurricane Sandy after Action 
Report, 5. 
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Beginning on November 5, approximately 280 troopers from eight states were 
deployed to assist in the response phase to the storm.133 This deployment was designed to 
reinforce the 300 NJSP members already assigned to the impacted region. In support of 
this deployment, IAU members created mapping products for the AORs. These maps 
incorporated real-time information related to storm damaged roadways. The maps 
included alternate routes of travel that officers used to navigate the new landscape. This 
information was critical to both local and foreign officers deployed to the region. In 
addition, these maps were prepared in conjunction with the daily product and included a 
data collection form that was designed to record the officer’s observations of their 
environment. A daily integration of all of these data streams was condensed to a briefing 
document for ROIC commanders to provide deeper situational awareness and add to the 
post-storm common operating picture.  
Throughout the initial response phase considerable resources were expended to 
accurately define the post-storm environment. To further this effort, the FLIT Unit 
conducted an outreach effort to the 49 municipalities within the AORs.134 This effort was 
centered on assessing the capabilities of each town’s essential services, which included 
specific elements of critical infrastructure such as: public safety, education, and public 
health. Furthermore, FLIT members structured their assessment to a recognized FEMA 
standard.  
Within days of the post-storm environment, the public began to exhaust the 
essential resources available to them. This problem was magnified by the inability of 
regional public utility authorities to provide power and water to customers in need. 
Additionally, the state began to experience a fuel shortage, which further hampered the 
ability for individuals to self-sustain. FLIT members created a relationship with the All 
Hazards Consortium and began the process of leveraging their managed private sector 
                                                 
133 “Troopers From Eight States Travel to New Jersey to Assist Law Enforcement,” press release, 
New Jersey State Police, November 5, 2012, http://www.njsp.org/news/pr110512a.html 
134 NJ RIOC, New Jersey Regional Operations & Intelligence Center Hurricane Sandy after Action 
Report, 4. 
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service customers.135 Through this process, the FLIT Unit was able to identify businesses 
that were capable of providing basic goods and services to those in critical need. This 
information was collected and electronically disseminated on a daily basis throughout the 
response phase to the storm.  
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The following two chapters include two additional case studies that are intended 
to highlight the specific responses to natural disasters. This chapter provided a snapshot 
of an incident that can be technically classified as a catastrophe. This classification goes 
beyond an anecdotal observation; it is aligned with a six-point definition created by Dr. 
E. L. Quarantelli.136 In essence, the classification is appropriate due to the degree of 
regional degradation that resulted from the storm. Since the following two chapters will 
provide studies of incidents that manifested lower levels of communal degradation, this 
becomes important. Though the incidents required coordinated responses, they did not 
directly affect basic human needs to the same extent.  
Despite the differences, the events still offer value for study. Future fusion center 
responses can be aided by examining the temporal and spatial nature of each incident. In 
the book, What Is a Disaster?, Rohit Jigyash opined that disasters are more easily viewed 
through defined parameters such as temporal (pre event/post event) and spatial (defined 
geographic boundaries of incidents).137 The included incidents were selected to 
demonstrate the ability of fusion centers to perform scalable responses. This ability is 
particularly important due to the dynamic nature of threats and uniqueness of each fusion 
center.   
 
                                                 
135 The All Hazards Consortium is defined as a network of thousands of stakeholders and resources to 
facilitate regional integration of systems and planning efforts between government and the private sector 
infrastructure owner/operators. The consortium was able to identify gas stations, banks, restaurants, 
pharmacies, and hotels that were open for business within the state of New Jersey. 
136 E. L. Quarantelli, “Catastrophes Are Different from Disasters: Some Implications for Crisis 
Planning and Managing Drawn from Katrina,” Understanding Katrina, June 11, 2006, 
http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Quarantelli/ 
137 Ronald W. Perry and E. L. Quarantelli, What Is A Disaster? New Answers to Old Questions 
(Philadelphia, PA.: Xlibris, Corp., 2005). 
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VI. 2012 COLORADO WILDFIRE SEASON CASE STUDY 
A. EVENT 
Leading up to the summer of 2012, Colorado had an uncharacteristically warm 
and dry spring that created ideal conditions for wildfires. This trend was experienced 
nationally; the 2012 spring season was the warmest on record, surpassing the previous 
record set in 1910 by 2 degrees Fahrenheit.138 The central Rockies experienced very dry 
conditions, and the region recorded the fourth driest spring in history. This dry and warm 
spring greatly affected the snowpack conditions in the Rockies. With the exception of the 
northwestern section of the mountain range, the majority of the Rocky Mountain states 
approached the summer with less than 50 percent of the traditional snowpack.139  
The summer offered no relief to the warming trend. Nationally, the 2012 summer 
season was the third warmest in U.S. history, which included the warmest July ever 
recorded.140 Colorado was no exception as the summer season was the warmest in the 
state had ever experienced. Due to these conditions, the National Seasonal Significant 
Wildland Fire Potential Outlook issued for June through August called for above normal 
significant fire potential through much of the western states, including Colorado. These 
arid conditions led to an increase in wildfire activity. Figure 9 is a temperature 
concentration map of the U.S. in 2012.   
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Figure 9.  NASA Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer Map of U.S. 
Land Surface Temperature Anomalies for June 17–24, 2012141  
The Rocky Mountain (RM) region saw a dramatic increase in total fires and acres 
burned as compared to the previous 10-year average as shown in Figure 10.142 Figure 11 
depicts the amount of acreage burned by region in the U.S. in 2012.  
 
Figure 10.  Total Number of Fires Per Region Over a 10-Year Average143  
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Figure 11.  Total Number of Acres Burned by Geographic Area144  
The 2012 Colorado wildfire season was responsible for some of the largest fires 
in the state’s history. For example, the Waldo Canyon Fire destroyed 347 homes and 
necessitated the evacuation of 32,000 Colorado Springs residents.145 In 2012, Colorado 
fire departments reported 4,167 wildland fires through the National Fire Reporting 
System.146 The fires destroyed more than 648 structures, killed six individuals, and 
burned more than 384,803 acres.147 These fires were believed to have caused over 538 
million dollars of damage.148 Several fires, including the Lower North Fork, High Park, 
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Weber, Waldo Canyon, and Wetmore, qualified for $25 million in federal reimbursement 
through FEMA.149 
B. CIAC RESPONSE TO 2012 WILDFIRE SEASON 
The CIAC was designed to incorporate an all-crimes/all hazards approach in 
support of initiatives regarding counterterrorism, criminal interdiction, public health 
threats, agricultural threats, and natural disasters.150 The CIAC fosters cross-
jurisdictional partnerships between all levels of government and the private sector. The 
center has become Colorado’s single-entry point for collection, analysis, and timely 
dissemination of all hazard related information. The dissemination of information is 
shared through analytical products created to service the center’s broad spectrum of 
intelligence consumers. Historically the center has operated from a central location. 
During the wildfire season of 2012, center analytical personnel were forward deployed to 
support ongoing initiatives that were combating regional wildfires. Under its new 
alignment in the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, the CIAC 
directly engaged its customers in the field.151 This innovation provided support to the 
EOCs actively involved in coordinating the response to the fires. The CIAC was able to 
deploy analytical assets by harnessing the structure of the center. The CIAC was 
structured as follows152:  
 Investigative and Analysis Support Unit (IASU)—The IASU is 
responsible for collecting and analyzing information points into cogent 
intelligence products. These products are developed collaboratively with 
local, state, and tribal partners in order to ensure that they coincide with an 
annual production plan. The production plan is a guide that ensures that 
the center meets the intelligence requirements of its stakeholders. The unit 
also evaluates the criminal environment by providing case support through 
processing queries and leads. The IASU also serves as an source of 
criminal deconfliction for multiple agencies investigating common 
offenders.   
                                                 
149 Ibid. 
150 “Colorado Information Analysis Center,” Colorado Sheriff XXIX, no. 1 (2008, summer): 23–24, 
http://www.csoc.org/documents/magazine/COSheriffSummer08.pdf  
151 Colorado Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, FY 2013 Annual Report, 
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152 Ibid., 27. 
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 Auto Theft Intelligence Coordination Center (ATICC)—The ATICC 
was created to reduce auto theft by within the state by providing timely, 
viable, and reliable intelligence to law enforcement. The unit serves as a 
central repository of auto theft and related crimes. The ATICC has 
identified auto crimes as a transitional event that relates to more serious 
and violent crimes in Colorado. The ATICC analyzes the data collected in 
order to attempt to identify any patterns or statewide trends.   
 Colorado State Patrol Intelligence Unit (CSPIU)—The CSPIU was 
intended to serve the Colorado State Patrol (CSP) by providing tactical, 
operational, and strategic intelligence to its command staff and field 
troops. This information was intended to drive operational deployments of 
CSP resources in order to optimize its effectiveness is disrupting statewide 
crime trends. The CSPIU is also tasked with identifying training needs 
regarding emerging criminal trends in Colorado.  
 Terrorism Liaison Officer Program (TLO)153—The TLO program was 
intended to strengthen information sharing and enhance multi-
jurisdictional partnerships between the public and private sector. The 
CIAC sought individuals from law enforcement, fire service, and 
emergency management in order to increase connectivity among allied 
partners.  
 All Hazards Intelligence Unit (AHIU)154-The AHIU is staffed by both 
sworn troopers and civilian analysts. The unit was designed to assist law 
enforcement with case support in criminal and counter terrorism matters. 
The unit also has the ability to provide intelligence products relative to 
dynamic situations such as disasters.  
In response to the unprecedented wildfire season of 2012, the CIAC developed 
the Mobile Analytical Response Team (MART) comprised of sworn CSP members and 
civilian analytical staff.155 This team was tasked with deploying fusion center assets to 
the areas most impacted by the incidents. The MART was equipped to work with first 
responders on the scene and provide analytical support. MART members were chiefly 
responsible for designing an information sharing structure and disseminating incident 
specific analytical products.156 The subsequent products were provided to executive level 
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decision makers to enable them properly allocate personnel and resources to the areas of 
greatest need. These products took a 360-degree approach to the incident and culled data 
far beyond traditional law enforcement concerns.  
One of the main products was the Flash Report.157 This report contained a 
running tally of the acreage burned, personnel involved, and estimated cost of the 
response. In addition, the report provided a snapshot of the anticipated weather and wind 
conditions, characteristics of the fire, and an overview of the area in which the fire was 
expected to travel. This product was shared with all of the responding agencies in order to 
support and assist in creating a common operational picture through situational 
awareness. The final analysis product combined all of the data streams that were fed by 
the numerous agencies deployed to fight the fires.  
In addition to the MART, the CIAC remained in constant contact with its TLOs in 
order to gather real-time information about the incident. The information provided by the 
TLOs was a crucial piece of the CIAC response due to the fact that the liaisons were 
aware of the standing information needs of the center. The information provided by the 
TLOs was rapidly absorbed and turned around in the next cycle of Flash Reports. As the 
CIAC and the MARTs were collecting information, a resident fire specific analyst was 
monitoring the incoming data steams for trends and patterns that may assist in structuring 
the response. Due to the dynamic behavior of wildfires, the fire analyst continually 
monitored reports from the field, which included wind conditions, areas containing large 
amounts of low lying vegetation, and trajectory toward populated regions.  
These relationships went beyond facilitating the response and mitigation efforts. 
During the wildfire season, the CIAC assisted a rural county sheriff’s office with 
investigating a series of wild fires that appeared to be intentionally set.158 The CIAC 
analytical team created a link analysis that leveraged data from multiple database queries 
such as automated license plate readers, temporal/spatial analysis, and historical criminal 
histories. Throughout this investigation, the CIAC supported all allied partners by 




fostering information sharing techniques. As a result, the investigative team was able to 
focus the investigation on vetted leads and ultimately arrest and criminally charge a 
suspect.  
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Historically, the State of Colorado has faced the threat of wildfires and managed 
to overcome crisis by utilizing a traditional emergency management response. This case 
study highlights the innovation of leveraging the capabilities of the CIAC for the 
discipline of fire response and arson investigation. During this examination, it was 
evident that the CIAC and its emergency management collogues began to gravitate 
toward collaboration prior to the incident. This can be inferred by the incorporation of a 
fire specific analyst to the fusion center. In an upcoming chapter, all of the fusion center 
responses will be analyzed to determine if the fusion process can be homogenized to 
assist the discipline of emergency management in abating heterogeneous threat profiles.  
The following chapter will address a lower impact but higher frequency event. 
The study based on the efforts of the VFC will continue to feature the tensile nature of 
the fusion process, which is directly related to the capabilities of fusion centers. This 
study will highlight the function of fusion enters in more common occurrences rather 
than catastrophic or “black swan” incidents faced in NJ and Colorado. The actions of the 
VFC will assist in displaying that collaborative efforts are not formulaic and have varying 
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VII. VIRGINIA EXTREME WINTER WEATHER CASE STUDY 
A. EVENT 
On February 12, 2014, a costal winter storm impacted the Mid-Atlantic region 
causing major snowfall accumulations in the Commonwealth of Virginia. The heaviest 
snowfall, in excess of 25 inches, was in Floyd and Montgomery counties.159 The 
remainder of the commonwealth ranged between 10–25 inches of accumulated snow.160 
In two regions of Virginia, this storm represented the third highest snowfall on record for 
a single event. This weather incident crippled the major vehicular interstates throughout 
Virginia. This was evidenced by the report of 1,599 motor vehicle crashes throughout the 
commonwealth.161 The storm directly resulted in two fatalities and damaged public 
utilities causing 7,422 customers to lose electrical service.162 Prior to the storm, Governor 
Terry McAuliffe declared a state of emergency on February 11, 2014.163 Stemming from 
this action, 24 local emergencies were declared and 23 EOCs were opened.164 Figure 12 
and Figure 13 are graphic visualizations of the severity of the winter storm.   
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Figure 12.  Polar Orbiting Satellite Imagery From February 14, 2014165 
 
Figure 13.  Snowfall Analysis for the Entire Event Ending 7 pm February 13, 
2014166  
                                                 




This storm resulted from a low-pressure system that moved off of the Virginia 
coast and interacted with a strong upper level wave, which assisted in creating a zone of 
heavy snow behind a “deformation zone.” This zone contributed to the snowfall amounts 
by adding to the precipitation and causing the storm to pivot and remain over the Virginia 
Blue Ridge, New River, and Roanoke Valley regions.167  
B. VFC RESPONSE TO EXTREME WINTER WEATHER 
The VFCs stated mission is centered upon fusing together resources from local, 
state, and federal agencies and private industry.168 Through this process, the center was 
capable of collecting, analyzing, and sharing information intended to increase the 
likelihood of preventing an attack. This overarching theme is fundamental to their 
secondary mission to support the Virginia EOC through centralizing information in order 
to participate in an effective response.169 
In order to perform its mission the center’s main operational units were structured 
as follows:170 
 Request for Information / The RFI unit provides database research assistance 
Criminal Activity Unit criminal case support services to VFC intelligence  
    and public safety partners. This unit also monitors  
    current and historical crime trends and provides  
    cold case support. 
 International Terrorism / The terrorism unit collects and analyzes all source 
Domestic Terrorism Unit data regarding domestic and international terrorism  
    trends and threats with a potential nexus to Virginia  
    in cooperation with federal, state, local, and military 
    partners. 
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 Critical Infrastructure & The critical infrastructure unit focuses on the  
 Key Resources Unit  identification of key assets and    
     dependencies,  analysis of suspicious activity  
     reporting and trend data, and supporting site  
     assessment efforts for steady state    
     operations and special event support 
 
 Gang Unit   The gang unit manages gang member information  
    across various databases to identify and analyze  
    emerging threats and patterns from international,  
    homegrown, Hispanic, street, and outlaw   
    motorcycle gang activity in the Commonwealth. 
The VFC manages the suspicious activity reporting (SAR) initiative for the 
commonwealth. The SAR initiative was designed to assist law enforcement line officers 
in understanding what kinds of suspicious behaviors are associated with pre-incident 
terrorism activities, documenting and reporting suspicious activity, and protecting 
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties when documenting information. In furtherance of 
this initiative, the VFC houses a Joint Terrorism Task Force that assists in vetting 
investigative leads prior to entry into the national database. 
The center also maintains a watch center that is staffed by member of the VFC 
staff. The watch officer role is rotational and is not staffed 24 hours a day. For critical 
incidents that happen outside of staffing hours, members observe an “on call” schedule. 
The watch center is primarily responsible for information collection and maintaining the 
center based information-sharing environment. Figure 14 and Figure 15 are 
representations of VFC sources of information and the subsequent manner in which it 
flows through the center.  
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Figure 14.  Representation of VFC Information Sources171  
 
 
Figure 15.  Representation of Information Flow within The VFC172  
On June 16, 2014, this researcher met with Deputy Director Albert F. Vincent of 
the VFC at his office in Richmond, Virginia. Deputy Director Vincent provided a factual 
                                                 




description of the operational aspects of the center specific to the centers assistance in the 
response to the costal snowstorm from February12, 2014.173 Through that description this 
researcher learned the following.  
The VFC is connected to the Virginia Department of Emergency 
Management (VDEM). This relationship has been formalized through an 
MOU. The MOU codifies the roles for each of the entities. Relevant to 
this study, the VDEM employs all of the civilian analysts that are not 
provided by other partner agencies. Although these analysts are VDEM 
analysts they are assigned to the VFC and placed into one of the units 
previously identified. Once these members are trained for the requirements 
of the VFC, they are cross-trained with responsibilities of the VDEM 
regarding EOC operation.  
During the snowstorm of February 12, 2014, the VFC transitioned the VDEM 
analysts from the VFC to the collocated EOC. The analysts became the point of contact 
for monitoring all databases related to identified critical infrastructure. This allowed the 
analysts to monitor and potentially forecast effects created by power outages to other 
sectors within critical infrastructure. The VFC analysts were also integrated into request 
management operations in order to deploy assets to the areas of greatest need.  
Additionally, the analysts monitored social media websites in order to determine 
current trends and patterns for the EOC. The analysts were able to focus on “tweets” 
concerning loss of power and stranded motorist.174 Through this method, VFC analysts 
were adding to the common operating picture by geolocating users of social media and 
generating areas of confluence that assisted in the deployment of resources.  
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In comparison to the previous two chapters, this disaster is far more pedestrian. 
This event was included in order to examine the level of collaboration between the fusion 
center and EOC. Additionally, this incident included the use of an emerging technology 
by the responders. If this scenario were to have occurred five years prior, there would 
                                                 
173 Albert Vincent (Deputy Directior, Operation Functions of the Virginia Fusion Center), interview 
with author, June 16, 2014. 
174 Virginia Department of Emergency Management, After Action Report—2014-02-12/13 Winter 
Weather (Chesterfield, VA: Virginia Department of Emergency Management, 2014). 
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have been no method to monitor the social media feeds. This forward leaning component 
of the VFC is an emerging tactic that is evidence of technological appropriation. It is a 
clear example of seizing “real-time” technology and leveraging it to the advantage of the 
VFC. 
The following chapter will take an amalgam of the case studies and overlay the 
fusion center responses onto an existing analytical framework. This will assist in 
reviewing the framework through the use of real-world examples. This analytical 
procedure may facilitate a discourse regarding fusion center responses. By examining and 
understanding the challenges faced by fusion center leadership in the cases provided, 
future leadership may be able to adapt and build upon the concepts and actions utilized 











The analysis included in this chapter will be based on the framework developed in 
the federally produced document CPG 502. The net result will be visually represented 
through a system design model. The previous three chapters provided case studies that 
factually defined the fusion center responses to natural disasters.  
 
Figure 16.  University of Texas Assessment Process175 
This chapter will examine the sum of those responses through the optics of a four-
step process designed to increase coordination and information sharing between EOCs 
and fusion centers.  
This process is akin to the program evaluation method created by the University 
of Texas. The model includes the creation of a study plan or methodology, data 
collection, and ultimately the reporting of results. It was designed to holistically examine 
fusion center response case studies through the metrics of environment, needs, 
procedures, and outcomes.176  
The included analysis evaluates the diverse fusion center responses in order to 
identify and further understand its role. David Brannan Ph.D, Kristen Darken, and Anders 
Strindberg Ph.D provided a more laconic description of the analytical purpose. In their 
                                                 




book, A Practitioner’s Way Forward: Terrorism Analysis,177 the analytical purpose was 
described as follows:  
Analysis is framed critical thought that allows the analyst or researcher to 
appropriately account for issues of bias, culture, source limitations, 
existing literature, common fallacies, limited access and challenges of the 
‘received view.’178  
Having a tested method allows the analyst to provide adequate “intellectual bins” 
to deconstruct narratives, case studies or assertions while critically exploring the 
relationship of the research subject to an “other.” That “other” can be an idea, group, 
action or thing. Analysis, unlike opinion, is repeatable because it uses a known set of data 
(such as a case study, event, policy or group profile) and critically considers that data 
through the articulated methodology. 
B. STEP ONE—FAMILIARIZATION WITH CAPABILITIES, NEEDS, AND 
REQUIREMENTS 
An examination of the included case studies, relative to step one, revealed that 
“no-notice” events have the ability to produce greater levels of complexity than “notice 
events.” The dynamic environments created by the incidents increased the challenges 
faced by the fusion centers. The common thread woven through the studies was the high 
level of spontaneity applied by the fusion center commands. The ability to improvise was 
enabled by the open communications between the fusion centers and the EOCs.  
Prior to each event, all of the fusion centers studied were found to be connected to 
their EOC counterparts. Of the centers studied, the VFC had the most comprehensive 
relationship due to its incorporation of emergency management personnel into the fusion 
center. Several VDEM civilian analysts are assigned full time to VFC units. These 
analysts assume their required VFC duties and then cross-train in the roles and 
responsibilities of the EOC. This commingling of personnel continues up to the position 
of deputy director. Despite their mature relationship, the strategy to locate stranded 
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motorists was devised in an ad hoc manner. Ad hoc solutions were present in all of the 
studies. These unscripted solutions were made possible through an understanding of the 
needs and limitations of each center. In all of the cases, fusion center commands amended 
their response plan based on identified information gaps from the EOCs.   
1. Analysis of Ad Hoc Responses  
During times of natural disaster in New Jersey, the IWW unit serves as a single 
voice of information dissemination during a significant event.179 In addition to 
distributing situational awareness reports that define the impact of significant events or 
the potential for such events, IWW unit members perform database entries and queries on 
critical virtual platforms. These platforms include the Homeland Security Information 
Network (HISN), National Crime Information Center, and the Broadcast News Network. 
The IWW unit will also disseminate situational messaging and relevant analytical 
products through established electronic distribution lists. Between the dates of October 
25, 2012 and November 11, 2012, the IWW unit was able to perform over 705 incident 
specific functions.180 These functions included the following: circulation of situational 
awareness reports, resolving requests for information, and collecting “real-time” 
information from the field. Each of the events studied produced varied levels of 
communal degradation. Within this variance, the fusion centers applied their collective 
capabilities and created analytical processes focused on furthering the subsequent 
response to the incidents. These processes ranged from monitoring social media, assisting 
with resource management, and partnering with the private sector in order to identify 
locations where citizens could obtain life sustaining goods and services.  
Due to the catastrophic aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, the prearranged response 
by the NJ ROIC was remodeled in an ad hoc fashion. The original plan only involved the 
use of the IWW component of the NJ ROIC.181 As the fusion center command began to 
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grasp the depth and breadth of the storm’s damage, more of the fusion centers resources 
were activated and dedicated to support impacted areas.  
The IAU transformed a daily deliverable analytical product. This product was an 
overview of the criminal and threat environment for the State of New Jersey. The NJ 
ROIC Daily Overview documented and thematically mapped all instances of gun 
violence, carjackings, and crime gun recoveries.182 This overview was also inclusive of 
suspicious activity reporting and prospective hazards, which included both natural and 
manmade hazards.183  
The new product was titled the Statewide Criminal Activity Related to Hurricane 
Sandy.184 The product was designed to provide a distillation of the statewide criminal 
environment while focusing on the most impacted regions (Monmouth and Ocean 
counties). This document went beyond the traditional daily overview and included lesser 
offenses believed to be related to post-storm activities. The cover included a map with 
several layers. Each layer was applicable to different constituents. The base layer 
included a choropleth map indicating power outages in the state. Additional layers 
included locations of violent crime and post storm related offenses. The report also 
included the following: crime gun recoveries, reported incidents of crime in affected 
areas, and storm based criminal intelligence.  
In the early stages of distribution, NJ ROIC commanders utilized the document to 
brief executive leadership, abet criminal information sharing for storm damaged police 
departments, and detect emerging criminal trends and patterns. Through the collection 
mechanisms created, the “Sandy Report” began to provide clarity and context in a time of 
crisis. On October 31, 2012, the Huffington Post reported that residents in storm-
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damaged areas were observing wide scale looting of abandoned properties.185 The IAU 
leveraged forwarded deployed detectives that were embedded in those specific areas to 
vet the reports. Although there was evidence of thefts, further scrutiny of those reports 
revealed isolated incidents of residents “trash picking” from the curtilage of properties.186 
This information was passed to commanders in order to provide them with the “ground 
truth” of the post-incident domain. This context afforded commanders the ability to refute 
claims of widespread looting in a published Star Ledger story published online and in 
print.187  
In early November, the IAU began to detect a pattern of sophisticated copper 
thefts from power stations in affected regions. The IAU compiled the reports and cross-
referenced suspects from similar thefts with similar modus operandi(s). The IAU 
identified a suspect who was found to be a wanted recidivist offender with a violent 
criminal history. After the suspect’s information was disseminated, he was arrested and 
charged for the theft of the copper. The criminal intelligence portion of the report 
provided IAU members the chance to include potential hazards not anticipated by law 
enforcement. Soon after the storm struck, the majority of resources were assigned to 
critical issues being faced by first responders. This reality left little room for prevention 
or forecasting. In support of prevention, the IAU began to record and disseminate to law 
enforcement partners the locations of firearm dealers reporting extensive storm damage 
to their facilities. This was not actionable intelligence, but it served as situational 
awareness to regional law enforcement of the potential for the thefts of large quantities of 
firearms. This analytical product served as a critical piece of the operating picture for 
those involved in the response. It clearly defined the criminal environment relative to the 
storm-impacted areas. It afforded decision makers the ability to deploy resources based 
on actual need rather than perceived need.    
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Despite the level of integration, the VFC made the decision with its EOC the 
decision to exploit social media to locate stranded motorist developed organically. As 
VFC analysts transitioned to the EOC, their original role was to assist with resource 
management. The social media monitoring component was an outcropping of their 
experience from the fusion center. Once the VFC analysts were activated, they identified 
specific locations of snowbound drivers and offered decision makers the ability to deploy 
limited resources to areas where they provide the greatest impact.   
The CIAC leveraged the MART to produce flash reports that were infused with 
real-time information from the field. Due to the aggressive nature of fire, this report was 
continuously updated and disseminated to incident commanders. Due to the pace of 
production much of the information was considered “raw” and was continually refined 
and vetted in future iterations.188 During this incident, it was determined that rapid 
updates offered greater value than delaying reports through the vetting process. This 
created the need to caveat the document and limit its distribution. This practice became 
the standard and was employed during a criminal investigation. When area near Colorado 
Springs was experiencing small but repetitive fire events,189 the CIAC was able to 
generate geo-spatial mapping product that included activity trends based on temporal/
spatial analysis associated with over 6,000 license plate reader entries.190 The products 
were provided to the investigative team who followed the leads generated. The creation 
of the MART took fusion capabilities outside the walls of the fusion center and into the 
field. This expedited the collection process, which allowed analysts to receive data in real 
time. As the environment rapidly changed, the MART created a method to capture 
analytical snapshots of the behavior of the fire.   
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2. Location of Centers  
Throughout the crisis states in which the centers operated, both the fusion centers 
and EOCs were able to effectively communicate. Through an examination of the 
activation process, it appears that colocation was pivotal to establishing an architecture 
dedicated to event driven information sharing. In New Jersey and Virginia, the fusion 
centers and EOCs are collocated in the same building. In Colorado, the CIAC is a 
distance from the state EOC. During the wildfire season, the CIAC created the MART for 
the specific purpose of relocating to the EOC in order to fully integrate with emergency 
managers.  
C. STEP TWO—ESTABLISH PARTNERSHIPS 
The highlighted disaster response functions performed by the fusion centers were 
aided by structured relationships with their EOC counterparts. Each fusion center was 
connected to its EOC through varying means and at varying levels. In Virginia, the two 
centers are aligned through a formal MOU. This understanding covers personnel and 
budgetary issues. During the 2012 wildfire season, the CIAC was absorbed into the 
Colorado Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, which placed 
both centers in to the same hierarchical structure.191 Finally, the NJ model is distinctive 
from the majority of states in the U.S. In New Jersey, both the Office of Emergency 
Management and the NJ ROIC are sections within the NJSP,192 and enlisted and civilian 
members of the NJSP staff both of these centers. All of the studied fusion centers report 
to a governance board, which is inclusive of leaders from a diverse array of government 
including representation from their EOCs. 
D. STEP THREE—DETERMINE THE PROCESS 
The fundamental elements of this step are centered upon the exchange of secure 
information and engaging the broader homeland security enterprise as well as key 
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components of the private sector. Through the research of the fusion center responses it 
was revealed that all of the centers have mechanisms in place to disseminate secure 
information to their EOC counterparts. Specifically, in the VFC, cross-trained analysts 
with secure clearances would have the ability to transition to the EOC and act as conduits 
of secure information.193 At the ROIC the IAU, which includes agents from the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, would have the ability to analyze and disseminate secure 
information to IWW. In the event of activation, IWW unit members position themselves 
within the EOC.194 
Within this step, the central concept focuses on the maintenance and application 
of fusion center based liaison programs. All of the fusion centers within this study 
maintain formal liaison programs. The CIAC and ROIC studies provide an in-depth look 
at these programs. During the 2012 wildfire season in Colorado, the CIAC became 
dependent on the strength of the liaison relationships with the EOC. During the season, 
the CIAC leveraged its TLOs for collection, inquiry, and dissemination.195 During the 
creation of flash reports, CIAC analysts obtained real-time information regarding the 
atmospherics of the rapidly changing fire environment from TLOs in the field.196 The 
liaisons were also used to confirm that analytical products were received by allied 
agencies involved in the incident. TLOs also offer an ability to gain from the collective 
experience of agency based subject matter experts. Selected individuals from the fire 
services supported the analytical process by providing expertise and context to the nature 
of wildfires.  
Once Hurricane Sandy subsided, first responders were left to pick up the pieces. 
Due to the severe damage to costal infrastructure, including governmental buildings, 
essential services, such as police, fire, and medical were greatly hampered. The ROIC 
liaison program was innovated in order to meet the needs of responders. The FLIT unit 
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moved beyond traditional governmental contacts and solidified relationships with private 
sector partners, such as the casino gaming industry, retail industry, and public utilities. 
This process began prior to storm landfall. On October 26, 2012, FLIT unit members 
facilitated the transfer of utility company assets across the U.S./Canadian border in 
preparation for power restoration.197 This served the EOC in furthering its resource 
management requirement.  
E. STEP FOUR—TRAINING, WORKSHOPS, AND EXERCISES 
The study of the included centers revealed that prior to each of the incidents the 
fusion centers and EOCs conducted joint exercises. Prior to Hurricane Sandy the ROIC 
had participated in emergency management exercises but those interactions were limited 
to the IWW component. The drills usually consisted of tabletop exercises regarding 
incidents at public utilities. In Virginia, the VFC is mandated to participate in a drill 
involving the loss and subsequent restoration of power. The VFC and EOC conducted 
those drills by injecting various severe weather scenarios in order to stress test their 
response. Contained in CPG 502 is a model of the CIAC’s cooperative exercise with their 
EOC. Through the preparation for the 2008 Democratic National Convention both centers 
trained toward establishing collaborative roles.  
F. CAN A CRUCIAL FUSION ROLE BE DETERMINED? 
Prior to answering the central question of this study, the subjective nature of the 
term “crucial” must be addressed. The Merriam-Webster online dictionary website 
defines crucial as, “important or essential as resolving a crisis.”198 The analysis of the 
fusion center responses uncovered common trends that were central to studies. These 
trends translate into important and essential elements. Collectively, these elements create 
a measurement that identifies the value of the role. The measurement created will not 
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have a scientific certainty, it is based on the concept from Douglas Howard’s book How 
to Measure Anything: Finding the Value of Intangibles in Business.199 Howard defined 
the purpose of measurement as a method to reduce uncertainty. This definition is befitting 
this social science study due to its qualitative methodology.   
The purpose of this study is to determine if fusion centers can play a crucial role 
in responding to natural disasters through collaborative relationships with EOCs. The 
preliminary answer to this question is simply “yes.” The research demonstrates that 
fusion centers provide a crucial role but that role is dependent on the collaborative 
relationship. For example, the majority of fusion center efforts were designed to meet the 
needs of the EOC. The value and relevance of the analytical products were directly linked 
to the data obtained by the EOC. The research suggests that the maturation of the national 
network of fusion centers is shifting toward an all hazards approach. This progression is 
evidence that existing capabilities can be appropriated to non-traditional functions. For 
example, throughout the case studies the fusion process was applied to culling data that is 
foreign to the criminal and threat environment. This data was analyzed and condensed. 
Ultimately, this added to creating a richer operating picture of the incidents.  
From a macro perspective, the crucial role of fusion centers is directly tied to the 
capacity to foster information sharing. The notion of information sharing is a very broad 
subject and can be abstract. The specific information sharing aspects found to be crucial 
were as follows: the application of the fusion process, executive decision support, and 
resource deployment. Figure 17 is a representation of the critical information sharing 
attributes related to disaster response. 
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Figure 17.  Information Sharing Aspects 
The fusion process generally refers to turning information and intelligence into 
actionable knowledge. This is related to the instances where the fusion centers filtered 
large sets of data and produced analytical products designed for a wide array of 
disciplines within the homeland security enterprise. Nested within this process are the 
mechanisms in which the fusion centers collected data. Through innovative processes and 
relationships, the centers obtained access to information from non-traditional sources and 
assisted in creating relevant deliverables to an enterprise wide audience. 
In a post-disaster environment, elected officials and executives require thorough 
decision support. This support should be derived from the common operating picture. 
Examples of this support are executive briefings that can assist in the creation and 
management of response strategies. Yi-Ru Chen explored this concept in her thesis “Tell 







Center.”200 In her study, Chen interviewed elected officials from major U.S. cities and 
states. Through interviews she learned that officials expected briefings to anticipate their 
needs. She also learned that the greatest value was providing information that could be 
readily disseminated to the public. The interviewees also expressed the need to establish 
public trust by avoiding surprises in rapidly changing environments. In a response to a 
survey question regarding decision-making needs, respondents noted that information 
should provide “true fusion” and not pass unsynthesized information.201  
Chen’s findings are corroborated by the work of Paul ‘t Hart, Uriel Rosenthal, and 
Alexander Kouzmin in their essay, “Crisis Decision Making: The Centralization Thesis 
Revisited.”202 In the essay, the researchers concluded that crisis events tend to create 
“explosions of data” these events could lead to “sketchy and ambivalent” reports.203 
Without proper analysis and context, crisis mangers may mislead and make poor 
decisions.  
A repeating theme in the case studies was the ability of the fusion centers to assist 
in broadening and deepening the shared situational awareness space for the aligned 
partners. This space was leveraged to provide executives a true account of the disaster 
environment. In the case of the Colorado wildfire season, the briefing tempo exceeded 
the CIAC’s ability to fully vet all of the information obtained. The CIAC mitigated the 
release of potentially misleading information through limiting distribution and retracting 
inaccuracies in future iterations.  
In all of the cases, the centers were able to pin point areas that required the 
deployment of resources. The centers accomplished this through the examination of 
confluences of data in concentrated regions. This ability allowed decision makers to 
prioritize need and to make informed decisions prior to committing personnel.  
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G. A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF 
COLLABORATION 
The remainder of this chapter will answer the secondary question posed in this 
study. Should collaborative relationships identified through the case studies endure over a 
protracted period of time or should they be configured on an ad hoc basis? This question 
will be addressed by modeling the collaborative components through systems theory. For 
the purpose of this analysis, the collaborative relationship will be the system modeled. It 
fits the definition of a system by manifesting sets of interconnected elements that are 
coherently organized to achieve something. The included model is a visual representation 
of the fusion center and EOC relationship during a natural disaster. Figure 18 is a visual 
representation of a collaborative response by fusion centers and EOCs. The figure goes 
beyond representing the original research question by demonstrating how the incident 
will ultimately dictate the required connectivity in the cooperative response.  
 
Figure 18.  System Design Model of Collaborative Disaster Response 
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During a disaster, both the fusion centers and EOCs will assume a role in the 
response. During that response, their collective output is represented in information 
sharing (previously identified as the crucial outcome). As information sharing is 
expended the central element will need to compensate for the output. The need to 
increase optimal collaboration will seek to replenish the main element (fusion center and 
EOC response). This description of the model has excluded two conditions: discrepancy 
and natural disaster. Discrepancy accounts for the difference between the current state 
and the desired state. In Figure 18, the arrows directing toward the empty space are inputs 
adding to the system. The natural disaster influence will ultimately dictate the tempo of 
the flow. 
The degree of degradation caused by the disaster will directly influence the 
amount of collaboration required to create the proper response output. As observed in the 
broad spectrum of incidents studied, the VFC had far fewer challenges than experienced 
by the CIAC. Conversely, the ROIC had to exceed its preplanned strategy to meet the 
needs of responders. This analysis may seem intuitive, but it deserves further thought.  
The majority of the literature on collaborative relationships focuses on increasing 
or maintaining current levels regardless of the situation. In certain circumstances, the 
attainment of optimal collaboration (or any other desired goal) may break the system. 
Lance Gunderson and C. S. Holling explored this possibility in the book Panarchy 
Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems.204 In their book, the 
researchers found that in social systems the accumulating of potential skills, networks of 
human relationships, and mutual trust can increase to a degree of being over connected 
and rigid. At these points, an agent of disturbance easily fractures the system. This 
pattern is clearly illustrated by Figure 19.  
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Figure 19.  Panarchy Model205  
This illustration demonstrates that if optimal collaboration begins in the lower left 
corner of r (exploitation), it will continue to grow and solidify to the point of fragility in 
the lower right corner of k (conservation). During the release phase, the fractured 
components will travel toward reorganization and begin the process again. This concept 
is extremely relevant to collaborative relationships specifically designed around the 
response to natural disasters. An example of the threat posed by this theory can be 
observed in the VFC case study. Imagine if the VFC had only one analyst in the center 
that had the expertise to data mine social media for stranded motorists. If that individual 
could not report to work on the day of the incident, the program could not be applied. 
Although this is a simple example, the perceived benefits of efficiency should be 
balanced with the cost and security of redundancy. 
This approach proposed by Gunderson and Hollings examines the possibility that 
the level of collaboration should be driven by the nature of the event.206 The best defense 
from progressing toward rigidity is adding resilience to the relationship. In the case 




studies, a degree of resilience is observed in the VFC. Analyst cross-training is a 
redundant action. When the VFC assigns them to the EOC in times of crisis, they become 
force multipliers. If the VFC analysts were forced to assume primary EOC roles, the loss 
of one individual could hinder the response. This system remains in balance until the 
incident becomes magnified. For instance, if the Virginia snowstorm involved 100 feet of 
snow accumulation, all resilience is eliminated and all systems become fragile due to the 
enormity of the event. In this exaggerated example, the fragility of the fusion center and 
EOC relationship becomes unimportant since the event is so large all other systems will 
be breaking. The goal should be to design a level of connection relevant to the scale of 
the incident. Through mutual exercises, center specific responses can be appropriately 
modeled in order to retain resilience and maintain flexibility.   
The final evaluation of the collaborative role is making conceptual alterations to 
the original analytical framework used in this study. The original framework was 
designed symmetrically in an open ended, linear fashion. This depiction of the framework 
organizes the steps into a loop. The circular design allows the process to continue rather 
than ending at the final step. This distinction is important, as technology advances or non-
sustainable funding streams end. The continued progression through the model will 
account for these conditions and allow the relationship to acclimate to new realities.  
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Figure 20.  Conversion of The Four-Step Collaboration Process  
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter analyzed the fusion center responses in order to definitively answer 
the research question. Although the answer may seem intuitive, this study provides 
evidence to defend the finding of information sharing as the crucial role fusion centers 
can play in disaster response. Additionally, the findings regarding the secondary question 
delve into an area outside the scope of the majority of relevant literature. The next 
chapter will list the study’s findings, present a conclusion, and offer recommendations 
that are designed to increase information sharing while not diminishing resiliency.   
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IX. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. FINDINGS 
This study was designed to determine if the fusion center could play a crucial role 
in responding to natural disasters collaboratively with EOCs. This question becomes 
pertinent when considering that the maturing national network of fusion centers is 
gradually shifting toward an all hazards approach. As a result of this shift, fusion centers 
have become more involved in disaster response and are venturing into the domain once 
solely occupied by emergency managers. Prior to initiating this inquiry, this researcher 
observed firsthand the role a fusion center played during a natural disaster. This spurred 
further thought about the nature of fusion center responses.  
 Do all fusion centers have disaster response capabilities? 
 Is there a way to measure the value of the response? 
 What can fusion centers add to the response effort? 
The research on this subject revealed that natural disasters are complex issues 
involving dynamically changing environments that require comprehensive responses. 
Traditionally, the mitigation of these disasters has been the responsibility of emergency 
managers. In order to properly direct and control the actions of personnel, emergency 
managers have created EOCs. Through these centers emergency managers have drafted 
policies and practices to maximize resources and assets. The fusion centers were 
originally conceived around the notion of preventing future terrorist attacks. In recent 
years, the emergence of fusion centers has created the opportunity to enhance their 
mission by incorporating new processes. These centers began to grow in numbers until 
forming a national network. As the network expanded, so did their purpose. Individual 
centers matured from threats to applying their processes toward criminal environments. 
Fusion centers continued to adapt and took on an all hazards approach.  
Once fusion centers opened their capabilities to the threat of natural disasters, 
their missions began to intersect with those of emergency managers. In an effort to 
maximize the effectiveness of the collective effort, leaders in both fields have been 
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working on methods to construct cooperative relationships. Through smart practices, 
national guidance, and the creation of common lexicons, EOCs and fusion centers are 
seeking to identify the proper breadth and depth of integration.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study has shown that the fusion center’s information sharing capability can 
serve as a resource for the EOC to draw upon during disaster responses. This section 
includes several strategic recommendations to mature collaborative relationships in order 
to generate timely and relevant information worthy of sharing. In considering the 
recommendations, it is important to note that the sheer size of this nation contributes in 
creating a diverse natural threat profile. This variance is also present in how threats are 
mitigated. Despite the fact that most EOCs utilize the ESF format, there are a myriad of 
manners in which they implement the function. What has become evident is that there is 
no “one size fits all” solution. These recommendations are strategic rather than tactical. 
Moreover, they will all stem from ways to enrich communication in order to allow data to 
flow and ultimately be fused. Their design accommodates the dissonant manners in 
which the centers operate and relate to one another during an active state environment. 
1. Role and Function of Intelligence in the EOC 
The case studies have identified specific instances where the intelligence role has 
been inserted in an ad hoc or incident specific manner. The manner in which the EOC 
performs during a disaster is based on a system of systems. Emergency managers should 
seek to understand the role of intelligence and formally place the component within a 
system of the EOC. This process should be decided at regional or local levels. As in most 
emergency management principles, the intelligence component is scalable to the needs of 
the situation. It is conceivable that this element may manifest as a command function, 
support annex, or section. It is more important for the component to be incorporated to 
the EOC than focusing on a national standard for organizational charts.  
Once the role is established it can be exercised through disaster based scenarios. 
With the exception of a “black swan” event the EOCs will coordinate with their regional 
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fusion center. As the relationships mature it will create a trusting environment that will 
permit the free exchange of data and information.   
2. Fusion Center Menu of Services 
Through the case studies, informal discussions with colleagues, and personal 
experience some of the main inhibitors to collaborative functions is a lack of 
understanding of capabilities. The emergence of fusion centers is relatively new. This, 
coupled with the recent attention given to the notion of intelligence applications for 
disasters, may present itself as a fad or short-term point of emphasis. Fusion centers 
should develop a menu of services relative to the standing information needs or essential 
elements of information required by an EOC during an active state response. A common 
menu can be shared throughout the national network, but each center should maintain an 
individual list. This individual requirement is founded on the reality that each center is 
unique and distinct. Although all of the fusion centers are collectively measured by 
critical operational capabilities and enabling capabilities, the operational tempos are 
proprietary to individual centers.   
3. Leveraging Common Communication Platforms  
EOCs and fusion centers each have a set of commonly used virtual platforms 
designed explicitly for their function. During periods of activation, the centers should 
have a fundamental understanding of web-based resources that may serve to add to their 
collection, dissemination, and analytical duties. The systems that have a common nexus 
to both centers, are free of cost, and only require basic training to perform query 
functions.  
a. HISN   
The Homeland Security Information Network (HISN) is a trusted network within 
the homeland security enterprise. It affords the sharing of sensitive but unclassified 
information. The system allows partners use to manage operations, analyze data, send 
alerts and notices, and in general, share information to a community of interest. One of 
the most applicable functions of HISN is its connect application. This feature affords an 
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entire community to conduct virtual briefings that are inclusive of live video feeds. This 
feature has assisted response personnel in relaying the visual impact of disaster areas. The 
combination of traditional data collection methods combined with the live video feed can 
greatly enhance the assessment process. This feature has been extended for use mobile 
devices. Figure 21 and Figure 22 are screen shots of HISN information sharing platforms.  
 
Figure 21.  Example of HISN Connect through a HISN Case Study207  
 
Figure 22.  Example of HISN Situation Room HISN Case Study208  
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b. Next-Generation Incident Command System  
The Next-Generation Incident Command System (NICS) is a mobile, web-based 
command and control virtual environment for dynamic incidents. It was created to assist 
first responders in properly defining the operating environment. It provides first 
responders the ability to collaborate by mutually building a common operating picture 
through the creation of digital diagram of the incident. This diagram is then available to 
all responders, who then can modify the image as the incident changes. The major 
advantage to NICS is that it is visually based rather than text based. All of the features of 
the program can be accessed through smart phones and mobile devices. NICS is a non-
proprietary, open community project that is free of cost for users. Figure 23 is an example 
of a user modified NICS map.    
 
Figure 23.  Example of NICS Map209 
4. Collaborative Focused Conferences  
Through a series of scheduled collaboration based meetings, practitioners can 
meet in order to discuss current challenges and enable trends to collaborative 
relationships. Through presentations, center personnel can begin to build upon smart 
                                                 
209 Web based NICS map. 
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practices created from cooperative responses to events. The meetings serve as an in 
person exchange of discipline based information. These conferences can also be a method 
of informal networking between personnel from distant regions with similar threat 
profiles.  
In March of 2014, DHS, National Fusion Center Association, Naval Postgraduate 
School, and National Emergency Management Association held a collaboration meeting 
in New Orleans, Louisiana. The meeting took place over several days and included over 
68 members of the fusion center and emergency management community. The stated 
purpose of this meeting was to provide a common understanding of the roles each center 
plays and how creating a collaborative environment would assist in protecting the 
homeland.210 
C. CONCLUSION 
Our society has advanced toward a state of heavy reliance on interconnectivity 
through technology and modern conveniences. This reality can strain resources in a 
steady state environment. When disruptive events occur, they can paralyze a community, 
region, or nation. A major challenge faced by emergency responders is returning 
impacted areas back to a normative condition. This study nests in the space between the 
event and the period when recovery begins. Emergency managers can benefit from the 
role of fusion centers in the response phase. The research has shown that the processes of 
the fusion center have assisted in creating a more thorough operating picture. In reality, 
this picture is a mosaic created through synthesizing data by analysis. From this picture, 
incident related information becomes consumable to stakeholders. These groups include 
decision makers, field personnel, and the community. In the wake of disasters, 
information becomes a perishable commodity due to the fluidity of a situation. Through 
the proper engagement of fusion centers, the picture can be refreshed with relevant 
information that can be a sound foundation for mitigation strategies.  
                                                 
210 FEMA, Fusion Center and Emergency Management. 
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The secondary question of this thesis developed into a thought that is outside the 
scope of much of the relevant literature. In viewing the concept of collaboration, it would 
appear that by putting the right people together, problems would begin to solve 
themselves. The research has shown that in order to maximize collaborative relationships, 
effort must be spent beyond the planning phase and into the function of the initiative. 
Collaboration is not a “one size fits all” or “plug and play” operation. The amount and 
duration of these relationships should be directly associated to the driving disaster 
influence. Furthermore, once these relationships are active, a basic level of redundancy 
must be preserved. An unintended consequence of optimization is fragility. In the specific 
case of collaboration, over connectivity between partners can cause the system to crack 
when it is needed most.  
This thesis sought to study the potential role for fusion centers related to natural 
disasters. Through research this question was answered as well as a secondary question 
regarding cooperative partnerships. Ultimately, this thesis should serve as a basic 
reference for fusion center responses. It can offer inspiration for the creation of policy or 
assist in the early planning stages of a pending incident. Although this thesis applied the 
tenets of social science, its intended audience goes beyond academia. This study was 
originated by considering what would most benefit practitioners in the field, especially 
when those practitioners are faced with enormous challenges such as natural disasters. 
This study goes beyond a “how to” guide, it provides readers a distillation of the pertinent 
literature, presented current case studies, and applied an emergency management based 
framework to the current trend of collaborative relationships. A lasting tribute to this 
thesis is not maintaining a space on a library shelf. It is better suited lying on the corner 
of a fusion center conference table, covered in coffee stains with frayed edges. This study 
should be used to further conversations between the two centers by going beyond 
anecdotal success stories through the examination of research in the topic area.   
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